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SOONG CHING-LING, A POLITICAL PROFILE

BY



MUNG KWOK-CHOI

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH IN PARTIAL  
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL, 1973



# ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am grateful to Dr. B. L. Evans for his guidance in the writing of this thesis.

MUNG Kwok-choi

Edmonton, Alberta  
June, 1973





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## INTRODUCTION

### A. An Overview

This is a political profile of Soong Ch'ing-ling (Mme. Sun Yat-sen) whose contribution to the Chinese revolution has so far been neglected by historians. Soong Ch'ing-ling was beautiful and accomplished. Consequently, she was often called a "doll" by Westerners in the treaty ports.<sup>1</sup> While Western correspondents in China during the revolution called her "China's Joan of Arc",<sup>2</sup> Edgar Snow called her "China's George Washington".<sup>3</sup> Vicent Sheean concluded that Soong Ch'ing-ling was an "exquisite fragment of humanity"<sup>4</sup> after his lengthy stay with the Hankow leaders in 1927. Rightist correspondents of the West defamed her as the "Huckster for Communism",<sup>5</sup> but some correspondents, such as Henry Lieberman of the New York Times Magazine called her "China's conscience"<sup>6</sup> because of her undying faith in the unfinished Chinese revolution.

The above quotations reveal the divergency of opinions about Soong Ch'ing-ling. However, none of these descriptions reveal completely her unique--albeit minor--role in the Chinese Revolution. Her importance to the Chinese Revolution cannot be compared with that of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Mao Tse-tung, nor even Chiang Kai-shek; but her contribution to the liberation of the Chinese people is no less unique than any of the three. To date no systematic study of Soong Ch'ing-ling's political career has been produced. Her unique role in the Chinese Revolution has been undeservedly neglected.

The political life of Soong Ch'ing-ling began with her marriage to





Sun Yat-sen in October, 1914. From 1914, until Sun's death in 1925 Soong Ch'ing-ling worked for the Revolution in the shadow of her respected husband; working as his secretary, translator, interviewer and even as negotiator. She did not emerge as an individual participant in the Revolution until after Sun Yat-sen's death. From 1925 to 1927, believing that the Kuomintang was in the hands of responsible and dedicated persons (the Left Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists), Soong Ch'ing-ling worked in close association with them. Thus it was only after Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolution that the importance and uniqueness of her role came into sight. Both the Left Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists were brutally butchered. Those who were fortunate to escape were driven to remote areas, at least temporarily. Soong Ch'ing-ling became the sole representative of the unfinished Revolution. Using well her invulnerable status as the "saint's widow", Soong Ch'ing-ling bitterly attacked Chiang Kai-shek, who with suppression and censorship, snuffed out all opposition.

Foreswearing the leisurely life of comfort, material affluence and family warmth, she determined to hold high the beacon-fire of the unfinished revolution, constantly reminding the Chinese people of Chiang's betrayal of that revolution. Throughout the thirties, she never stopped criticizing Chiang's regime and his clique, many of whom were her own close relatives. She recognized no other principle for all of her political activities save the good of the Chinese people.





It was for her dogged faith in the revolution, her dedication and her sense of justice in single-handedly attacking the powerful Chiang regime and for her attempt to obtain fair trial and freedom for hundreds of students and intellectuals captured by Chiang's regime that she was called "China's conscience".

There is no need to exaggerate Soong Ch'ing-ling's contribution to the Chinese revolution. The uniqueness of her role can be truly reflected by placing her political activities against the backdrop of events in China. This political profile will attempt to show what Soong Ch'ing-ling had really done in those years of turmoil, from the fall of Hankow in 1927 to the triumph of Communism in 1949. This period is the climax of Soong Ch'ing-ling's political activities, when she fought single-handedly against the injustice represented by Chiang Kai-shek's regime.

## B. Sources

There are no historical studies of Soong Ch'ing-ling. Apart from Emily Hahn's The Soong Sisters and Cornelia Spencer's (Yaukey Grace) The Three Sisters, which are biographical stories in the form of popular novels, there is little. However, there is a large number of articles of varying quality scattered in various newspapers and magazines. In addition, a collection of about sixty of Soong Ch'ing-ling's speeches made since the fall of Hankow in 1927 was published by the People's Republic in 1952 under the title of The Struggle for New China. These speeches reflect Ch'ing-ling's views on the Chinese



revolution, on civil liberties and on the Kuomintang-Communist struggle. Other source material concerning the Chinese revolution since 1911 is, of course, plentiful.

### C. Nature of this Study

In this study, emphasis is placed upon the period from the fall of Hankow to just after the birth of the People's Republic. However no study of Soong Ch'ing-ling is possible without some reference to her early life. Chapter I attempts to provide the setting of her family, schooling and her marriage to Dr. Sun.

Chapter II provides a brief sketch of the power struggle within the Kuomintang and Soong Ch'ing-ling's involvement in it. The final agony of the Hankow Government in 1927 and Soong Ch'ing-ling's attacks on Chiang's betrayal of the revolution close this chapter.

Chapter III gives a description of Soong Ch'ing-ling's life in exile and her political activities during this period. Her struggle for civil liberties under the Chiang regime is also discussed.

Chapter IV deals with Soong Ch'ing-ling's contribution in the formation of the United-Front and her attempt to preserve the precarious unity between the two political parties throughout the War of Resistance and the Civil War.

Chapter V concerns the work Soong Ch'ing-ling had done after the formation of the People's Republic.



The conclusion attempts to summarize and to evaluate the work Soong Ch'ing-ling did through out her long years of participation in the Chinese revolution.





## CHAPTER I

### THE BEGINNING

#### A. Family and Schooling

Soong Ch'ing-ling was born of a rich compradore family of Shanghai in 1890. Her father, Soong Chia-ju (宋耀如), also called Charles Jones Soong, was educated as a minister at Vanderbilt University, but later he turned to business in Shanghai. Like most returned students, Soong Ch'ing-ling's father was dissatisfied with the ineptness of Manchu rule, and had for sometime been a personal friend of Dr. Sun Yat-sen prior to the marriage between Dr. Sun and Soong Ch'ing-ling. Therefore, in Soong Ch'ing-ling's childhood, Dr. Sun was a frequent visitor in the family and the Soong sisters treated him as a sort of an uncle.

Soong Ch'ing-ling was educated at home under a private tutor until the age of seven when she was sent to the McTyeire School for Girls in Shanghai, a boarding institution.<sup>1</sup> There, she remained until age fifteen when she was sent abroad to study in a private school in Summit, New Jersey. Later she entered the Wesleyan College at Macon, Georgia, from which she obtained a B.A. degree in 1913. After this she returned to China.

Soong Ch'ing-ling had great aptitude for English and of the three Soong sisters, she was the most studious. Even as an adolescent, she had deep interest in China's problems. She often



published her views in the student literary magazine, The Wesleyan. The success of the revolution in 1911 prompted her to write an essay for The Wesleyan, in which she naively glorified the revolution as the "greatest event of the Twentieth Century". She hailed the revolution as the key to the solution of all the problems facing China, with Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, the three great principles of the French Revolution 1789, being established in China.<sup>2</sup>

Although Soong Ch'ing-ling's view of the revolution was too idealistic and full of wishful thinking, it did show her genuine concern and enthusiasm for the Chinese revolution. Also, when Soong Ch'ing-ling received the Five-Barred Flag of the Revolution, she emphatically tore down the Dragon Banner from the wall, crying, "Down with the dragon! Up with the flag of the Republic!"<sup>3</sup>

Throughout her years in the United States, Soong Ch'ing-ling nurtured an idealistic view of the Chinese revolution, and a consequent hero worship of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, whom she admired for his contentment of living in poverty, a great contrast with his contemporary politicians. Obviously, in the young mind of Ch'ing-ling, Sun was more than a national hero, but also the savior of China,<sup>4</sup> who had sacrificed his personal comfort for the Chinese people.

## B. Marriage

Soong Ch'ing-ling's worship of Sun might never have developed into a romance had Sun appeared as a successful national savior. When Sun, who had fled to Japan after the failure of the second revolution





in 1913 against Yuan Shih-kai, appeared in Yokohama to meet Soong Ch'ing-ling, she was struck by the difference between Sun's actual appearance and what she had envisaged. Sun was half-sick and frail, worried after breaking with the ambitious Yuan Shih-kai.<sup>5</sup> What hurt him most was that many of his former comrades had stuck to their posts in Yuan's government.<sup>6</sup> In exile in Japan, Sun lived in poverty, a striking contrast to the well-to-do Soong family who were also exiled in Japan at the time.

With burning faith in the revolution, Soong Ch'ing-ling offered to fill the vacant post of Sun's secretary. His former secretary, her sister, Ailing had married H.H. Kung.<sup>7</sup> Soong Ch'ing-ling' entered Sun's life at a most opportune moment. Sun, in 1914, was at the lowest ebb of his political career. Soong Ch'ing-ling, with a heart for the revolution, became Sun's sole comfort as well as his "most trusted secretary".<sup>8</sup> Soong Ch'ing-ling threw herself into the task helping him. She believed in the revolution, and she believed in Sun.

During Soong Ch'ing-ling's childhood and adolescence, revolution meant the bringing down of the Manchus. All other problems from which China suffered would be adjusted automatically. This naive view of the revolution Soong Ch'ing-ling inherited from her parents. When she came into close contact with the revolution--the difficulties, the promises and the goals--she was more and more stirred by the very justice and rightness of Sun's revolutionary principles; believing that China would yet be a nation free from foreign domination, and



her people free from starvation and humiliation. She had become aware of the true meaning of the revolution. Political revolution, if not accompanied by social and economic changes was but a court-intrigue.

In a letter to her sister in 1914, Mei-ling, who was still studying in Wellesley, Soong Ch'ing-ling revealed her year's experience of the revolution and its leader, Sun,

"He (Sun) is too weary and too ill to write much in his own hand.... I am next to the very center of the Revolutionary movement, I am learning what has actually taken place, I begin to see the tremendous proportions of what will have to take place.

"We get to discuss things, Dr. Sun and I. We are like father and daughter, he is so much older. And it pleases me to have him say in his quiet, appreciative way.... He is an unassuming man, Mei-ling, a man who wants no glory for himself.... He is very depressed sometimes. He hates intrigue and he hates militarism and yet he knows it will take both to make the revolution succeed." 9

After more than a year of work with Dr. Sun, Soong Ch'ing-ling's political ideals had matured. She knew both Sun's secrets as well as his ideals. Revolution became a part of her life, without which, life would be meaningless. 10

Both Dr. Sun and Soong Ch'ing-ling knew how much that year meant to both of them. To Dr. Sun, Soong Ch'ing-ling became the sole comfort of his lonely days of political exile. His first marriage to Lu Mu-ching was a marriage of filial obedience, between a 17 year old college student in Hong Kong,<sup>11</sup> and an illiterate village girl--<sup>12</sup>. Though she had borne him three children, Dr. Sun was estranged from his wife throughout the long years of exile. Moreover there was the



difference in outlook and political ideals. The marriage was, in fact, a constant source of "a good deal of domestic unhappiness."<sup>13</sup> To Soong Ch'ing-ling, who had decided to dedicate her life to the Chinese Revolution, and, above all, to the comfort of the lonely man who made the Revolution possible, she offered to marry Dr. Sun. Still there was no thought of love, but the worship of a hero and a passionate desire to help China.<sup>14</sup>

Dr. Sun hesitated to accept Soong Ch'ing-ling's offer especially when the difference in age was considered. He told her just before her departure for Shanghai for a visit:

"You are so young, I am almost an old man-I have a grown son. I live in the uncertainties of being a revolutionary leader - and you would dedicate yourself to helping me! Ch'ing-ling, I can scarcely forgive myself for bringing you again into contact with this thing - this hunger, this disease, this torment which gives the heart no rest once it is infected with it. Won't you wait? Won't you go back to Shanghai and live there a while and see then how you feel? I cannot accept now."<sup>15</sup>

Sun's former marriage did not constitute much of an obstacle to Sun and Ch'ing-ling. For Mme. Lu, the frequent and long separations, the uncertainties and dangers in Dr. Sun's activities were too much of an ordeal already. She had offered to choose a second wife for Sun but Sun had refused.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, when she was asked about the possibility of his marriage to Soong Ch'ing-ling, Mme. Lu agreed readily to a separation, but not a divorce, which would have caused her to forfeit her social position and privileges. Evidently Dr. Sun took this agreement as a moral equivalent of a divorce.<sup>17</sup>





However, the greatest obstacle to the marriage between Dr. Sun and Ch'ing-ling came from the Soong family. First of all, her parents belonged to the comprodore class, a class whose revolutionary ideals were limited to the overthrow of the monarchy and to a modest program of reform. Any social and economic revolutions which would harm their privileged positions would be the first thing to which they would object. Therefore, to allow Soong Ch'ing-ling to marry Dr. Sun meant to give a daughter away to a man who would ultimately be their enemy. Secondly, the Soongs were practical people who saw marriages as a possible family asset.<sup>18</sup> "Good" marriages like the one between Ai-ling and H. H. Kung, who was reputed to be a descendant of Confucius and came from a traditional banking family in Shensi, not only enhanced the wealth of the family but also provided "honor and dignity" which families like the Soong's were seeking. Dr. Sun's dubious stituation and his political uncertainties did not endear him to Soong Ch'ing-ling's parents. His poverty and his "harmful" revolutionary programs constituted a dangerous liability if Dr. Sun were to become part of the family. Therefore there is no wonder that Soong Ch'ing-ling's parents flew into a rage when Soong Ch'ing-ling told them of her wish to marry Dr. Sun.<sup>19</sup>

Soong Ch'ing-ling stayed in Shanghai for more than three months<sup>20</sup> to persuade her parents to gave consent to the marriage. After making sure that her parents' consent would not be granted, she secretly went back to Japan to join Dr. Sun. It was a courageous act for



a Chinese girl with a "good" family background to go against the conventions of both the Christianized and the non-Christianized society.<sup>21</sup> The couple was married on October 25, 1914,<sup>22</sup> in Toyko, in a simple ceremony. Immediately after the marriage, Soong Ch'ing-ling resumed her secretarial work and started learning cryptography, doing secret coding and decoding on behalf of Dr. Sun.<sup>23</sup> Apparently, she was happy with her marriage and her work for Dr. Sun. In a letter to an American school friend, she wrote:

"It (the marriage) was the simplest possible, for we both hate surplus ceremonies and the like. I am happy and try to help my husband as much as possible with his English correspondence. My French has greatly improved and I am now able to read French papers and translate by sight easily. So you see marriage for me is like going to school except that there are no "exams" to trouble me".<sup>24</sup>

One of the immediate results of the marriage was a great deal of criticism from different circles. Hu Han-min and Chu 'Chi-Hsun (朱敦信) criticized the marriage in front of Dr. Sun.<sup>25</sup> Many other comrades instead chose to ignore the marriage. The most spectacular reaction was from Soong Ch'ing-ling's parents. Charlie Soong attacked Dr. Sun bitterly and tried every possible way to annul the marriage on grounds of the failure to obtain parental consent. When this failed, the Soong family broke all relations with Dr. Sun, disowned Soong Ch'ing-ling, and withdrew all financial support from the newly reorganized Chung-hua Ke-min-tang (中華革命黨 Chinese revolutionary Party).<sup>26</sup> There was never a complete reconciliation between the Suns and the Soongs, the latter remained aloof until the death of Dr. Sun



when he suddenly rose to be a national hero.

The Soong family's attitude toward the marriage also influenced the attitude of the Christian Societies in Shanghai. The name of Dr. Sun was no longer conjured up in missionary activities.<sup>27</sup> Some in the Christian communities called Ch'ing-ling an "adventuress".<sup>28</sup> Bishop Henry Bond Restarick even criticized the Suns in terms of Christian ethics.<sup>29</sup> However, all these criticisms were pointless. When Chiang Kai-shek and Soong Mei-ling (宋美龄), the youngest among the Soong sisters, married on December 1, 1927, in similar circumstance, they not only received the wildest acclaim from the wealthy Chinese circles in Shanghai, but also from church people who saw in the Generalissimo, the hope to christianize China.<sup>30</sup> The snobbishness and hypocrisy of Christian circles had alienated Dr. Sun and Ch'ing-ling from both the Chinese and foreign church people. A sense of distrust between them was inevitable. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why Dr. Sun, in his later years, had come to criticize the missionaries as agents of imperialism.<sup>31</sup> Wang Chi-chen observed well that:

"In Sun Yat-sen's later years his hatred of Western imperialism led him to link missionary enterprises with foreign exploitation and caused him to make public utterances that were interpreted as anti-Christian."<sup>32</sup>

There was never a complete reconciliation between the Suns and the Church people, just as the relations with the Soongs did not improve during the remaining years of Dr. Sun's life. But while some former comrades of Dr. Sun regarded the marriage as disgraceful, young students all over China rejoiced at having Soong Ch'ing-





ling to work for the Chinese revolution.<sup>33</sup> She in the words of Vincent Sheean, had come to "share Sun's passion against injustice of every kind, his determination to organize and prolong the revolt of the masses...."<sup>34</sup> Because of her understanding of the youth, because of her underlying faith in the Chinese revolution, she was destined to be a symbol with which the student movements in the late twenties, thirties and forties identified.

In the years after the marriage 1914-1922, Soong Ch'ing-ling, despite her own dislike for public occasions, accompanied Dr. Sun in nearly all his public appearances.<sup>35</sup> She travelled with Dr. Sun in and out of China, served as Dr. Sun's interpreter, and participated with him in meetings, sharing all his joy and dangers. Several times, she barely escaped with her life.<sup>36</sup>

### C. Dr. Sun and the Soviet Union

Unexpectedly, these years of frustration for Dr. Sun turned out to be one of the most important periods in the history of the Chinese revolution. Dr. Sun now recognized that his early optimism about the Republic was totally unfounded. For more than thirty years of dedicated revolutionary work, there was nothing to show but a republic without democracy. To his dismay, Chinese parliamentarism, under the control of a succession of Peiyang (北洋) generals, was the laughing-stock of the nation. Parliamentarianism "became disastrously associated with militarism, disorder, insecurity and



poverty."<sup>37</sup> Furthermore, the prospects of the Kuomintang, the revolutionary party formed in 1912 out of the old old Tung Meng Hui were hardly encouraging. Immediately after it was formed, it fell into disunity and bureaucracy.<sup>38</sup> Neither the subsequent reorganizations of the Kuomintang into the Chung-hua Ke-min-tang (中華革命黨) in 1914 in Japan nor the formation of the Chung-kuo Kuomintang (國民黨) in 1920 was sufficient to revitalize the revolutionary elan.<sup>39</sup> The Party, under Sun's care, had no effective contact with the masses, nor had it any effective military power.

Dr. Sun had always counted on the help of the west and Japan to help carry out the revolution. But the prospect of help from the west and Japan was hardly encouraging. They continued to collaborate with the northern warlord governments at the expense of China's integrity and national interest.

As early as 1918, Dr. Sun had initiated official contacts with the Soviet Union by sending Lenin a letter, congratulating him on his success,<sup>40</sup> and stating that both the Chinese and Russian Revolutions aimed at "leading to the liberation of the peoples and to the establishment of enduring peace."<sup>41</sup> According to Ho Hsiang-ning (何香凝) (Liao Chung-k'ai), Dr. Sun was seriously thinking of sending Liao Chung-k'ai (廖仲愷), his most trusted aide, to Russia to study.<sup>42</sup> It is clear from this evidence that Dr. Sun was attracted by the success of the Russian revolution. But before turning to the Soviet Union, Dr. Sun made a final bid for obtaining aid from western nations. In 1918,



he advanced the rather naive project of "International Development of China". The central idea of the project was to industrialize China with international capital for the benefit of the world. Then all national industries would be made a Great Trust owned by the whole Chinese people. If this is to be realized, socialism in China would be created by the help of western capitalism.<sup>43</sup> The plan was presented to Britain, France and the States, but these countries never took this plan seriously.

Besides his disillusion with the West, Sun was also disappointed with Japan in 1922. The Japanese Government never responded to Sun's plea of help, but in fact, made use of Sun's plea as a lever to exact concessions from Yuan Shih-kai's Government. This was the case when Japan made the Twenty-One demands in 1916.<sup>44</sup>

Ever since then, Dr. Sun drew closer to the Soviet Union and Germany; both like China were the underdogs, outcasted and humiliated by the hands of the West. Since September, 1922, Dr. Sun secretly corresponded with Weimar Germany and the Soviet Union, seeking an alliance with both of them.<sup>45</sup> Germany was completely disinterested in China after the War, but the Soviet Union was responsive.

After Chen Chiung-ming's revolt in June, 1922, it was clear that the Kuomintang was a completely futile revolutionary force unless some drastic reforms were effected. Foreign help in reorganizing the Kuomintang was desperately needed.

The ground work of the Soviet-Kuomintang collaboration was





laid by Maring (Sneevliet) who was sent to China by Lenin in 1921 as the Comintern's representative to the First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai.<sup>46</sup> After a detailed observation of the Kuomintang, he presented to Dr. Sun two concrete proposals. First, the revolutionary party must ally with all classes, especially the proletariat and peasantry. Second, a military academy must be established to provide the necessary armed forces for the revolution.<sup>47</sup> These proposals materialized officially in the "Joint Manifesto of Sun, Yat-sen and A. A. Joffe" in 1923, stipulating the Soviet Union's commitment to lend support to the Chinese Revolution.<sup>48</sup> But the plan for the reorganization of the Kuomintang was not yet laid down until after a series of negotiations between Dr. Sun and Michael Borodin, the Comintern representative in China.

Perhaps the most important work that Soong Ch'ing-ling undertook in the period 1914-1925 was to actively participate in the negotiations between Dr. Sun and Borodin.<sup>49</sup> These led to the reorganization of the KMT along Soviet lines and the inclusion of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members in the Kuomintang on a personal basis.

Beginning early in 1922, Soong Ch'ing-ling had also been closely associated with a number of important left Kuomintang members, notably Liao Chung-k'ai and his wife, Ho Hsiang-ning who was about ten years Soong Ch'ing-ling's senior and always treated her as some sort of a niece.<sup>50</sup>

The years after 1923 clearly revealed the trend: Dr. Sun



and consequently Soong Ch'ing-ling, were drifting towards the left. Dr. Sun's orientation towards the left was undoubtable.<sup>51</sup> This can be best illustrated by his letter to the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., written on his death-bed.

"Taking my leave of you, dear comrades, I want to express the hope that the day will soon come when the U.S.S.R. will welcome a friend and ally in a mighty, free China, and that in the great struggle for the liberation of the oppressed peoples of the world both these allies will go forward to victory hand in hand."<sup>52</sup>

The importance of this message lies in the fact that it had clearly reflected the true state of mind of Dr. Sun. His faith in the Soviet alliance was undoubtedly a reason for Soong Ch'ing-ling's continuing association with the left Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists after Dr. Sun's death.

The death of Dr. Sun on March 12, 1925 in Peking marked a new beginning in the Chinese Revolution and also a new beginning of the political career of Soong Ch'ing-ling. From 1914 to 1925, Soong Ch'ing-ling had worked for the revolution in the capacity of Dr. Sun's wife and personal secretary. After the death of Dr. Sun who overnight had become the "Father of Modern China", Soong Ch'ing-ling suddenly became the most respected person in China. How she acted, what she said had incalculable influence upon millions of young patriotic Chinese. Her influence, her invulnerable status as the widow of Dr. Sun and her continuing association with the left Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists foreshadowed the unique role she was to play in the Chinese revolution after 1927.



## CHAPTER II

### SOONG CH'ING-LING AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE COUNTER REVOLUTION 1925-1927

#### A. Soong Ch'ing-ling and the "Cult" of Sun Yat-sen

After his death in 1925, Dr. Sun was hailed as the "Father of Modern China". His birth and death dates were declared as national holidays by the Kuomintang. Millions of young Chinese mourned his death. His "Three Principles" and his Will were studied in great depth. With Sun's death, China lost the living symbol of disinterested love of the nation. This loss was particularly acute as few politicians of his time were not self-seeking. He was also the symbol of all the Chinese who hoped their country could stand up on her own feet. He symbolized the unfinished revolution which most of the Chinese were determined to realize. Above all, he was the symbol of unity in the Kuomintang. In fact, he and the common sentiment for him was the only unifying element among the left, the right and even the communists who had joined the Kuomintang on a personal basis. His death foreshadowed the inevitable breaking up of the Kuomintang as a unifying force of all revolutionaries working for national unification.

The break-up of the Kuomintang did not come immediately after the death of Dr. Sun. In fact, the Kuomintang tried to use the



Sun Yat-sen cult" as an instrument for national unification. Young Chinese were specially urged to imitate Dr. Sun's life-long dedication to the revolution. The ruling members of the Kuomintang, hoped that by hailing Dr. Sun as a sort of a saint, cohesion among the different factors in the Kuomintang would be created.<sup>1</sup>

As the widow of the "infallible Dr. Sun", Soong Ch'ing-ling also became sacred, and commanded the respect of millions of patriotic youth. As later events were to prove, Soong Ch'ing-ling was to be the focal point from which many of the student movements drew their inspiration.

Before the death of Dr. Sun, Soong Ch'ing-ling held no official position in the Kuomintang. She acted as his secretary and for most times, interviewed and negotiated on behalf of Dr. Sun. Since 1923, Soong Ch'ing-ling had also associated herself with the left- Kuomintang and the communists. After 1925, she renewed her ties with the left-KMT and the communists, especially those working in the communist-dominated Shanghai University, headed by Ch'u Chiu-pai ( 瞿秋白 ).

The first clear indication of Soong Ch'ing-ling's alignment with the left faction of the KMT after the death of Dr. Sun was her active participation as a leader and an organizer in a series of nationwide protests before and following the May 30 and June 23 Incidents.<sup>3</sup>

The killings from these incidents infuriated the Chinese people. A strong wave of nationalist and anti-imperialist feeling, centered about Dr. Sun and his Three People's Principles was aroused. Protests





and strikes of Hong Kong workers, which in effect had paralyzed the Colony, were organized by Borodin and the left factions of Kuomintang under the leadership of Liao Chung-kai who was also the head of the Labour Department of the Canton Government.<sup>4</sup> Throughout this tempestuous period of protests and strikes, Soong Ch'ing-ling stayed in Canton and participated in the planning of the workers' movements. She also worked at the Revolutionary Schools in the Bureau of Propaganda,<sup>5</sup> a department of the Canton Government which had come heavily under the domination of the Chinese communists. In short, long before the Convention of the Second Congress of the Kuomintang in 1926, Soong Ch'ing-ling's orientation towards the left was unmistakable.

In spite of Soong Ch'ing-ling's strong desire to lead a semi-retired life in Shanghai, her devotion to Dr. Sun compelled her to do the utmost for the Chinese Revolution. In the Second Kuomintang Congress in January 1926, she was elected a member of the Central Executive Committee and took office in a number of government bodies, including the Political Council. She was also asked to head the Women's Department. However, she declined this post in favour of Ho Hsiang-ning (lme. Liao Chung-kai), who was undoubtedly more experienced. Nevertheless, Soong Ch'ing-ling was keenly interested in the feminist movement. Between 1925 and the beginning of the Northern Expedition in July 1926, Soong Ch'ing-ling stayed in Canton for most of the time, and worked for more educational opportunities for women. She was also responsible for setting up many women's



organizations which were later grouped into the Women's Institute of Political Training in Hankow<sup>6</sup> - an important creation in her early political career.

The sudden emergence of Dr. Sun as a national hero also affected the attitude of Soong Ch'ing-ling's parents. Being practical people, they recognized that Dr. Sun was a much bigger asset to the family than they had expected. Honour and glory would be profuse for the Soong family if Soong Ch'ing-ling agreed to go back to the Soongs. Several telegrams were sent to ask her to go back to Shanghai. But she turned a deaf-ear to all these pleas. She knew clearly that her family belonged to a class that was destined to be the enemy of the revolution,<sup>7</sup> that their class interest must be wiped out before the livelihood of the mass could be bettered. Family ties were not enough to take her away from the Chinese revolution nor were they enough to harness her anti-Chiang activities and speeches after 1927. In short, Soong Ch'ing-ling recognized no other principle in her activities than what she thought would be good to the Chinese people. As one foreign correspondent observed, Soong Ch'ing-ling herself was "China's Conscience".<sup>8</sup>

#### B. Power Struggle within Kuomintang 1925-1927

The upsurge of nationalism after the death of Dr. Sun did infuse a sense of cohesion among the Kuomintang members. Nearly all members vowed to follow Dr. Sun's Three Principles and Three Policies. But



this sense of cohesion was short-lived. In the words of Agnes Smedley, "his (Dr. Sun) followers and clique within the KMT set out to distort and finally wreck the revolutionary structure that Sun had built for all his life".<sup>9</sup> This was primarily due to the fact that the KMT lacked an ideology to unite all the various elements and to give them a sense of direction. Dr. Sun had been vague in defining his political ideology. His political theory was a combination of many incompatible ideas. The Western concept of democracy, Marxism, socialism, welfare economics, the planned society and anti-imperialism were all mixed up in his Three Principles. Dr. Sun's followers could easily cite his work to support their own political views, no matter what their political beliefs were. Naturally, the divergent elements had come into open conflict with the passing away of Dr. Sun - the only unifying force among his followers. Moreover, Dr. Sun's Three Policies which included the "inclusion and support of the nation's workers and peasants in the work of revolution", were a direct challenge to the social status and economic privilege of many of his followers, such as Hu Han-min (胡漢民), Tai Chi-tao (戴季陶) and Tsou lu (鄒魯). Opponents and followers of these Three Policies soon split the Kuomintang into two opposing camps, the Right and the Left. Hu Han-min, acting Generalissimo and Foreign minister was the leader of the right, while Liao Chung-kai, whom M.N. Roy regarded as the "leader of Chinese Jacobinism",<sup>10</sup> was the leader of the left. Not only did Liao have the support of Soong Ch'ing-ling, the sacred





widow of Dr. Sun, he was also the head of the Labor Department, the Minister of Finance and the Party's Political Representative to the Kuomintang army.<sup>11</sup> According to Professor Chung-Gi Kwei, who had actually participated in the struggle between the Left and Right factions, Liao Chung-kai in 1925 was holding thirteen important concurrent posts in the Kuomintang.<sup>12</sup> Liao was the most influential member of the Kuomintang.

Bitter struggle between the Left and Right factions of the Kuomintang led to the use of warlord tactics by the Right faction. On August 20, barely a few months after the death of Dr. Sun, Liao Chung-kai was assassinated at the entrance to the Central Party Headquarters. A special committee composed of Wang Ching-wei, Hsu Chung-chi and Chiang Kai-shek, was set up to investigate the assassination. When it was known that Hu Han-min's implication was evident,<sup>13</sup> the left faction and the Chinese communists requested the special committee to arrest him. Instead, the Special Committee sent Hu on a tour to Moscow.<sup>14</sup>

The assassination of Liao Chung-kai, and the subsequent "exile" of Hu Han-min, once the acting Generalissimo, left the throne of power vacant. It was occupied by Chiang Kai-shek, who became the General Military Commander, in addition to his position as the president of the Whampoa Military Academy.<sup>15</sup> Both the Chinese Communists and the Left faction of Kuomintang members did not object to Chiang's assumption of the military power because Chiang was,



at the time, among the most vociferous of those advocating strong measures against the Right.<sup>16</sup>

### C. Chiang Kai-shek and the Power Struggle 1925-1927

It is true that the Second Kuomintang Congress in January 1926 resulted in the domination of the Kuomintang by leftists and the Chinese Communists. But this domination had no real foundation. In a time when only military power counts, domination in the Congress, without the backing of the army, was illusory. By letting Chiang Kai-shek monopolize the Kuomintang armies after Hu Han-min's exile, the left Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists had committed a serious mistake, a mistake for which they had to pay dearly in 1927. Ever since then, the Chinese Communists, especially Mao Tse-tung, have made sure that politics have to take command of the gun.

Meanwhile, Chiang Kai-shek fully recognized his new power as General Military Commander of the Kuomintang's armed forces. With the military power in his hand, he could challenge Wang Ching-wei, the nominal head of the Canton Government, for the supreme position in the Kuomintang at any time he saw fit. The time came when Michael Borodin, the master-mind of the Chinese Communists and the left-Kuomintang members, went to the North in March 1926 to talk Feng Yu-hsiang (冯玉祥) into the cause of national unification. On March 20, Chiang Kai-shek staged a coup, subsequently known as the "Chung-Shan Incident."<sup>17</sup>



The intention of Chiang's move was clear. The "Chung-Shan Incident" was but a show of force to the left Kuomintang members, the Chinese Communists, and the Russians that if the KMT-CCP United-Front was to be preserved, it had to be on terms agreeable to Chiang, i.e. more power centralized in his hands.

The "Chung-Shan Incident" resulted in a clear cut victory for Chiang. Not only did the Soviet Union reshuffle the Comintern agents in China, the Chinese Communists led by Chen Tu-hsiu, were also told to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards Chiang. Wang Ching-wei was asked to take a timely sick-leave to France, so as to enable Chiang to assume Wang's post of the Chairman of Military Council, which also logically meant the Commander-in-Chief of the impending Northern Expedition.<sup>18</sup>

By adopting the policy of appeasement towards Chiang, the left-Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists were destined to suffer its consequence. Allowing Chiang to have more power and prestige meant increasing his bargaining power. Soon, the left-Kuomintang members and the Chinese Communists would find Chiang's bargaining power too great and his ambition too high to cope with.

#### D. Soong Ch'ing-ling and the Hankow Government

In the meantime, Chiang was satisfied with the Communists' compliance with his restrictions. Therefore, he set in motion the Northern Expedition on July 9. Fifteen Soviet military officers,



including Galen (Blücher), chief military adviser to the Canton Government, accompanied the expedition. Soong Ch'ing-ling also participated in various parts of the military preparations, and she organized the Wounded Soldiers' Relief Association, of which she was the chairman.

The Northern Expedition forces scored victory after victory. Changsha and the whole of Hunan fell rapidly and in mid-September, Chiang's forces took Wuhan.

The Chinese Communists and left-Kuomintang members concentrated their effort in organizing mass movements. The appeal of nationalism and prospect of social revolution not only helped to consolidate the revolutionary bases but also helped to lure the warlord armies to defect. This is one of the reasons why the revolutionary forces obtained such amazing results so rapidly.

But the proliferation of mass movements had its distasteful side for Chiang. The Kuomintang took a decidedly left-wing turn at the expense of the Right faction, of which Chiang was definitely the leader after the "Chung-Shan Incident". To Chiang's dismay, in a special session of the Kuomintang in late October 1926, two important resolutions were adopted. One was the recall of Wang Ching-wei from political exile. The second was to investigate the suitability of moving the Nationalist capital to Wurhan because of its greater strength in the working class. In November, a group of five, composed of Soong Ch'ing-ling, Sun Fo, T.V. Soong, Eugene





Chen, and Borodin was dispatched to investigate the possibility of transfer.<sup>19</sup> However, Chiang was bitterly against it and proposed Nanchang instead. Subsequent arguments between Chiang and Borodin resulted an open break between them.

As a show of protest, Chiang boycotted Hankow's first Central Executive Committee on March 10, 1927. The right-wing members of the Kuomintang also stayed in Nanchang with Chiang. The Hankow group reacted by abolishing the chairmanship of the Government Council, Political Council and of the Military Council, and instituted a system of group leadership. Chiang, at that time, was holding all the three posts that the Hankow civilian government had abolished.

During the tug of war between the Hankow group and Chiang Kai-shek's group, foreigners and the wealthy Chinese bankers and industrialists were looking for a means to sabotage the social program of the revolution. They found Chiang Kai-shek who, like themselves, was willing to see China united without social revolution. The chance of collaboration came when Chiang's forces entered Shanghai and Nanking.<sup>20</sup>

According to J. P. Powell, Sterling Fessenden, American chairman of the International Settlement, entered into negotiation with Chiang Kai-shek on behalf of the French chief of Police in Shanghai. Chiang agreed to bridle the "rising monster" of Communism with foreign support.<sup>21</sup> Having made sure that the imperialist powers and the wealthy Chinese compradores would support the national unification,



Chiang Kai-shek did not hesitate to strike at the Communists and at the mass movements which had been the very foundation of Kuomintang success so far. At mid-night, April 12, Tu Yueh-sen (杜月笙), the leading gangster in Shanghai, who practically monopolized Shanghai's opium trade, gambling and prostitute business, attacked the unprepared Shanghai workers. Thousands of Tu's green gang (青幫) gunman, armed with foreign rifles, slayed thousands of youths. Following the "April 12 Massacre", Chiang Kai-shek cracked down on all workers' organizations in Shanghai and Nanking. Many Communist leaders were arrested, including Chou En-lai who later escaped through bribing his guards. The final result was a clear-cut victory for Chiang. And to reward Tu Yueh-sen's help, Chiang "legalized" Tu's opium trade by appointing him chief of the Bureau of Opium Suppression. He was also presented the "Order of the Brilliant Jade."

The Hankow government immediately reacted by expelling Chiang Kai-shek from the Kuomintang party. But Chiang, whose prestige had been so great among the Rightists, found no difficulty in setting up a rival government in Nanking. The Rightist elements of the Kuomintang elected Chiang to head the Nanking government on 18th April, only six days after the massacre. At this point, the unity of Kuomintang had virtually collapsed; and the death of the revolution followed closely.

The break between Hankow and Nanking presented a hopeless situation for the Hankow leaders. The Hankow forces, under the



command of T'ang Sheng-chih, was weak. It could neither defend Hankow from the warlords' attack, nor from Chiang's far superior forces. The only hope of survival was General Feng Yu-hsiang, whom Vincent Sheean described as a "big, slow brute with a highly developed sense of his own power."<sup>22</sup>

At the same time, the Hankow government displayed a trace of schism when danger was imminent. Even the left-Kuomintang members, Sun Fo and Wang Ching-wei were of the opinion that the mass movements had been carried too far. Peasants in the countryside started seizing lands and waged a sort of class war against the landlords. In the cities, factories were closed and the labor unions assumed police functions while the Chinese Communist cadres stirred up the mass movements. The Kuomintang leftists became increasingly indifferent to them.

The spark that set off the final break between the Kuomintang leftists and the Communists was the foolish action of H.H. Roy, an agent of the Comintern, and whom Mao Tse-tung later called a "fool".<sup>23</sup> On June 1, Roy showed Wang Ching-wei a Comintern telegram demanding a further extension of land reforms, the creation of a new army composed of peasants and workers, and the displacement of the old members of the Kuomintang Central Committee with new representatives of the workers and peasants.<sup>24</sup>

Roy's blunt tactic combined with the unwillingness of the Kuomintang leftists to go along with the new program precipitated



the final schism. Consequently, Wang Ching-wei and Sun Fo discussed this with Feng Yu-hsiang. Apparently, they agreed to break with the Communists and joined Chiang Kai-shek instead. An understanding was reached between Chiang and the Kuomintang leftists on June 19. Thus, the fate of the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation was sealed. Feng Yu-hsiang sent a telegram to the Hankow Government two days later, demanding the dismissal of Borodin. It also said: "All Wuhan Communists who wish to proceed abroad can go, Nanking welcomes the cooperation of those remaining, but requests the earliest decision to hasten the formation of a unified front against the north."<sup>25</sup> Chiang also sent an ultimatum to Hankow at the same time. The collapse of the Hankow Government - the symbol of Dr. Sun's Three Principles and the symbol of Kuomintang-Communist cooperation - could come in any minute. Wang Ching-wei, Sun Fo, H.H. Kung, and T.V. Soong had joined Chiang at Nanking already. The final agony of Hankow came when Tang Sheng-chih, commander of the Hankow armies, proclaimed a counter-revolution on July 15. Borodin, Soong Ch'ing-ling and Eugene Chen scattered in flight in disguise.<sup>26</sup> It seemed the revolution had really ended.

July 14, just one day before Soong Ch'ing-ling's flight from Hankow, she wrote a long statement directly attacking the Kuomintang's betrayal of the revolution. Not only did she unveil the hypocrisy of many Kuomintang members who proclaimed to be the true followers of Dr. Sun, but she also expressed the faith that the revolution would





succeed in the end. Attacking those who self-deceivingly held the view that the revolution meant national unification only, she said:

"Today we face a crisis and we must probe searchingly into fundamental questions for fundamental answers. We must answer the questions of the nature of revolution, and what changes are involved.

In the last analysis, all revolution must be social revolution, based upon fundamental changes in society; otherwise it is not a revolution, but merely a change of government." <sup>27</sup>

Soong Ch'ing-ling also upheld the importance of the masses in the revolution. This was meant to be an attack on the rightists who regarded the mass and the mass movements harmful to the revolution. She said:

"In this principle (of livelihood), we find his (Dr. Sun's) analysis of social values and the place of the laboring and peasant class defined. These classes become the basis of our strength in our struggle to overthrow imperialism and cancel the unequal treaties that enslave us, and effectively unify the country. These are the new pillars for the building up of a new, free China. Without their support, the Kuomintang, as a revolutionary party, becomes weak, chaotic and illogical in its social platform; without their support, political issues are vague. If we adopt any policy that weakens these supports, we shake the very foundation of our Party, betray the masses and are falsely loyal to Sun Yat-sen..... We have built up in them a great hope. They have placed in us a great faith. To that faith we owe our final allegiance." <sup>28</sup>

It is interesting to note the similarity between Soong Ch'ing's attitude towards the peasants and workers and that of Mao Tse-tung's at the same period. Mao wrote in the same year, "without the poor peasants there can be no revolution. To reject them is to reject the revolution." <sup>29</sup> Soong Ch'ing-ling's view on the importance of the peasants and workers shows her deep understanding of the nature



of the Chinese revolution. In the twenties, neither the Kuomintang leftists nor the Chinese Communists had any real understanding of the nature of the peasants as a revolutionary class, at least not until Mao Tse-tung assumed control of the Chinese Communist Party after the Tsung-yi Conference in 1935. Prior to that, the Chinese Communist Party had only a dubious attitude towards the peasantry as a revolutionary class. Party chiefs such as Chen Tu-hsiu and Chu Chiu-pei, regarded the workers as the only true revolutionary class. The mass movements in the rural areas were seen as expedients to arouse national sentiment and as a supplement to the national unification.

Commenting upon the Kuomintang's abandonment of social revolution in order to compromise with Chiang, she lamented at the degeneration of the Kuomintang:

"The Party is no longer a revolutionary Party, but merely a tool in the hands of this or that militarist. It will have ceased to be a living force working for the future welfare of the Chinese people, but will become a machine, the agent of oppression, a parasite fattening on the present enslaving system."

One must wonder at the far-sightedness of Soong Ch'ing-ling. The Kuomintang, after 1927, did, as she had predicted, become such a rigid political structure that could no longer respond to any form of social challenge. Indeed, after 1927, the Kuomintang had ceased to be a revolutionary force working for the people.

Yet, Soong Ch'ing-ling was optimistic about the revolution.



The key to success was "the millions of people in China".<sup>31</sup> In the years following the fall of Hankow and up to 1929, Soong Ch'ing-ling continuously challenged the credentials of the Kuomintang as a true revolutionary party after abandoning the "Principles of the People's Livelihood." She had also done her utmost to unveil the hypocracy of the Kuomintang members "operating under the banner of revolution, but actually working in support of the very social structure which the party was founded to alter."<sup>32</sup>



CHAPTER III  
EXILE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR  
CIVIL LIBERTY

A. Shanghai 1927

When General Tang Shang-chih revolted against the Hankow leaders on June 15, Soong Ch'ing-ling returned in secret to her home in Shanghai, a house located in the French Concession bequeathed to her by Dr. Sun. Before she left for Shanghai, she told her friends, the Communists, "...we shall never for a moment forget. The real revolution has not yet begun!"<sup>1</sup> From that moment on, she began her single-handed fight against Chiang Kai-shek's government and eventually gained recognition as "the constant heart of a still unfinished revolution."<sup>2</sup> But, she was more helpless than before. Her communist friends were driven underground and the left Kuomintang including her step-son, Sun Fo and her brother T.V. Soong along with H.H. Kung had reached a compromise with Chiang Kai-shek.

The compromise between Soong Ch'ing-ling's immediate relatives and Chiang Kai-shek was particularly irritating to her. Although the distance between her house and that of her relative was short, it symbolized the gap in their conception of the revolution. The proximity constantly exposed Soong Ch'ing-ling to nearly unbearable pressure from her family to compromise. Chiang Kai-shek, for political reasons, was also interested to have Soong Ch'ing-ling join the Nanking government. He





offered her a special train if she would consent to go to Nanking.<sup>4</sup> But she had steadily refused to give up her position and reiterated part of her statements of July 14 to reply to his plea. She replied in the status of the widow of Dr. Sun so that Chiang would appear unmistakably as a betrayer of Dr. Sun's principles. But Soong Ch'ing-ling's uncompromising position also turned herself into a virtual prisoner. Fearing that Soong Ch'ing-ling might further embarrass the newly formed Nanking government, Chiang Kai-shek imposed a strict vigilance on her house. Her contact with the outside world was also curtailed; no correspondents were allowed to visit her.

For nearly two weeks, Soong Ch'ing-ling had the boring life of a prisoner. But on August 1, fifteen days after the fall of Hankow, she appeared to receive a short reprieve with the Nanchang Uprising.<sup>5</sup> The Nanchang Uprising which saw the beginning of the Red Army was a direct challenge to the military dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek, for its leaders proclaimed to represent the Kuomintang. A presidium of seven was elected to direct a twenty-five member Revolutionary Committee, and Soong Ch'ing-ling was elected to the presidium. Because of her inability to join the uprising, Soong Ch'ing-ling's appointment was honorary but it gave her some comfort that the fire of the revolution had not been extinguished completely.

Nonetheless her state of seclusion worried her. There was always a possibility that her name would be used to sanction the policies of



the Nanking government without her knowledge. In fact, her staying in Shanghai might be used as a proof of her compromise with the Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Something had to be done to show her dissent from the Nanking government with which her family was so closely associated. Finally, she decided at the end of August, to make a public visit to Moscow, a self-imposed exile, to demonstrate her loyalty to Dr. Sun's Three Policies.

Because Soong Ch'ing-ling was so closely watched her visit to Moscow had to be made in the closest secrecy. On the night of August 22nd, Soong Ch'ing-ling and Rayna Prohme, an American woman working for the Chinese Revolution in the Hankow government, escaped from her house and reached the Whangpu River. A row boat awaited them there, to take them down river to a Soviet ship which subsequently took them to Vladivostok, from whence they took a train to Moscow.

By her flight, Soong Ch'ing-ling demonstrated once again her dedication to what she thought was a just cause. Refusing to compromise with Chiang Kai-shek and rejecting power, wealth and comfort which would be hers, Soong Ch'ing-ling deliberately chose the uncertain path of exile. What supported the physically fragile Soong Ch'ing-ling in her fight against her family's pressure and Chiang Kai-shek's "all-powerful" government was her faith in the final outcome of the Chinese revolution and of the future realization of Dr. Sun's Three Principles. Randall Gould, an American correspondent in China in the twenties and thirties



was particularly impressed by the faith Soong Ch'ing-ling showed in Dr. Sun and his teachings.<sup>6</sup> This was also well-attested to by such correspondents as Anna Louise Strong, Vincent Sheean and Edgar Snow.

Before heading for Moscow, Soong Ch'ing-ling published an article. It was suppressed in all Chinese newspapers. Only a few foreign owned publications published it. In this article, Soong Ch'ing-ling explained in detail the importance of Dr. Sun's Three Policies as formulated in 1924. She said,

"It was a statesmanlike application of these Three Policies of Sun and the correlation of forces deriving from them that enabled the Kuomintang power to put an end to ten years of disorder and confusion in Canton, and to create and finance revolutionary armies that conquered their way to the historic line of the Yangtze...."<sup>7</sup>

She went on to discuss how the Three Policies, especially the "inclusion and support" of the nation's workers and peasants in the work of the revolution", gave a new vitality based on mass support to the Kuomintang. Yet she lamented the betrayal of the Three Policies by these Kuomintang leaders who professed to be followers of Sun, and "are now becoming or are about to become, the secretaries and clerks of the new Caesar."<sup>8</sup> Though no names were given in her accusation, it was clear that the new Caesar was Chiang Kai-shek, and the secretaries and clerks included most of her family and relatives.

The most important part of this article was Soong Ch'ing-ling's conclusion that the final success "in the struggle with Chinese militarism and foreign imperialism is possible only by a right correlation, under



Kuomintang leadership; of the revolutionary forces issuing from the Three Policies."<sup>9</sup> As the "revolutionary Kuomintang" was completely non-existent and the Three Policies were carried out by the Chinese Communists, there is little wonder that Soong Ch'ing-ling would work in conjunction with the Chinese Communists later. For Soong Ch'ing-ling did not identify so much with the name of the party as with its policies and goals. In the thirties, it can be easily seen that the work of the Chinese Communist Party was much closer to the ideal of Dr. Sun than was that of the Kuomintang.<sup>10</sup>

#### B. Exile

Once in Moscow, Soong Ch'ing-ling and her group were caught in an internal struggle among the leaders of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Hankow government and the virtual elimination of the Soviet influence in China meant clearly a failure of Stalin's policy. Trotsky and his group sought to capitalize Stalin's failure. As a result of the subsequent struggle between the two groups, Soong Ch'ing-ling and the Hankow exiles had no idea of what the new Soviet China policy would be. Trotsky's group was more friendly to the Hankow exiles, while the official attitude shown was courteous and quite cool.<sup>11</sup>

Amidst all this confusion, Soong Ch'ing-ling continued to keep alive the true spirit of the Kuomintang by issuing articles on the Three Principles and the Three Policies. In less than a month, she published eight articles, explaining to the Soviet people the state of





the Chinese revolution. Also by identifying herself as the representative of the Left Kuomintang, she refused to acknowledge the "death" of the Left Kuomintang, even though the left Kuomintang was completely powerless. Among these eight articles, four of them were addressed to the women and the youth of the Soviet Union. She recognized that emancipation of women was basic to any social revolution. This was especially so in China where hundred of millions of women were still in the "bondage of semi-feudal and medieval social ideas and customs."<sup>12</sup> Real revolutionary change could not be effected unless the Chinese women were rescued from that pitiable state. In "Youth and Revolution", another article she wrote in Moscow in September, she explained how she came to recognize the importance of youth as the vanguard of the revolution. In her words, "Youth is the bulwark of the revolution." It forms the guard that stands sentinel and protector over the gains of the revolution and the force that hastens the course of history in its drive towards a better world."<sup>13</sup> She also pledged that she would start organizing the youth in China in a way similar to that of the Soviet Union. This pledge materialized in the thirties and forties when she participated in organizing student movements.

But the most important article that Soong Ch'ing-ling published in this period was "Statement issued in Moscow"<sup>14</sup> which explained the reasons why she was in the Soviet Union. The intention was "to make clear to the world that the men on the Yangtze who are now representing themselves as the spokesmen of nationalist China do not voice the sentiment



of the revolutionary Kuomintang and do not speak for China's masses." The second reason was to fulfill one of the most cherished desires of Dr. Sun "to confer with the strong revolutionary friends of China" (the Soviet Union) personally. Apparently, this article was addressed to the Chinese people as much as it was addressed to the Soviet Union. She hoped that by touring the Soviet Union, her disagreement with the Nanjing regime would be known to the Chinese people, and the true nature of the regime would thus be reflected.

But the intention of her self-imposed exile was ignored by some leading newspapers in the West. The New York Times apparently was interested in printing innuendo rather than facts. In October, it printed on its front page a story that Soong Ch'ing-ling was going to marry Eugene Chen, and that they were going to the Crimea for a honeymoon. By printing this story, the New York Times created the impression that Soong Ch'ing-ling's flight to Moscow was just an elopement with no connection to the Chinese Revolution. This subtle, injurious attack, completely based on innuendo, was a blow to the physically weak Soong Ch'ing-ling. As a result, she fell ill in Moscow for three weeks.<sup>15</sup> As she began to recover, she suffered another blow by the news of the marriage between Chiang Kai-shek and her youngest sister, Soong Mei-ling. The event celebrated on December 1, with all the extravagant displays of a "society wedding" had the blessings of all the foreign dignitaries and missionaries who had once condemned Soong Ch'ing-ling's marriage to Dr. Sun as "immoral".<sup>16</sup> The marriage between her sister and the man



she thought of as the arch-enemy of the revolution was an irony that she found hard to accept. What hurt her most was that she knew the marriage was purely a political maneuver and that Chiang could from then on legitimately boast himself to be the blood-relative of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.<sup>17</sup>

The Hankow group in Moscow became smaller in number as winter came to Moscow. Eugene Chen left for China some time in October, and Rayna Prohme died on November 24. Thus, Soong Ch'ing-ling was left alone in Moscow without personal friends. Her situation was worsened by the fact that her income had been cut off from China, and she had no winter clothing.<sup>18</sup> What little money she had had to be reserved for the unknown period of exile. In the funeral procession of Rayna Prohme, Vincent Sheean was pained to see her "shivering...through the dreary, frozen streets in a thin dark cloak."<sup>19</sup> Yet Soong Ch'ing-ling was too proud and too independent to accept the help of strangers.

After several months in Moscow, Soong Ch'ing-ling tired of the loneliness and decided to go to Europe for a change. She settled in Berlin and later Paris where Vincent Sheean had gone after Rayna Prohme's death. She stayed in Europe until the spring of 1929. She lived in inexpensive accommodations and steadily refused to obey the call of her family, and to accept any of the offers of ease and prominence from the Chiang Kai-shek government. The "honor" of high position and "comfort" of material affluence from the Nanking



government were regarded as a betrayal of all that her husband had lived for. Anna Louise Strong aptly described her actions in this period as a flight from victory.<sup>20</sup>

Soong Ch'ing-ling's exile in Europe was hardly a pleasant one. She was from time to time attacked by slander. She was rumoured to be marrying various persons from time to time. This was particularly annoying to her and injurious to her prestige, especially in China where remarriage of a widow was considered a loss of dignity. Besides these slanderous attacks, she was also accused as being the mouthpiece of the communists, and thus denying her any independent judgement. Apparently, among the Nanking leaders, a woman was not able to have independent judgement. As one who had always been a leader in the feminist movement in the Canton and Hankow government, Soong Ch'ing-ling was annoyed. It was no wonder that she angrily told Anna Louis Strong in Paris, "when I make any statement, they will not concede that I, a woman can have an opinion. All my opinions have been influenced, it seems, and usually by Moscow."<sup>21</sup>

In the meantime, the Nanking government, after eliminating opposition of the leftists, was stabilized, and gained recognition by various foreign governments. Further wanting to enhance its prestige, the Nanking government tried to utilize the burial ceremony of Dr. Sun to recall Ch'ing-ling, and also elected her to the Central Executive Committee.

On hearing of the completion of the grand tomb of Dr. Sun in





the Purple Mountain outside Nanking near the Ming tomb, Soong Ch'ing-ling agreed to go back to China in the spring of 1929. At once, the Nanking government was in jubilant mood, for Chiang Kai-shek had become a member of the Soong family and nearly all the Soong brothers and sisters had joined the Nanking government. Therefore they were confident that Soong Ch'ing-ling would remain in Nanking at the persuasion of the Soong family. Soong Ch'ing-ling also thought of this. Fearing that her return to China might be interpreted as a move to sanction the Nanking government, Soong Ch'ing-ling published an article in Berlin in May 1929 just before she left for China. She said:

"I am proceeding to China for the purpose of attending the removal of the remains of Dr. Sun Yat-sen to the Purple Mountain where he desired to be buried.....

It must therefore be abundantly clear that my attendance at the burial will not mean and is not----to be interpreted as in any sense implying a modification or reversal of my decision to abstain from any direct or indirect work of the Kuomintang,.....so long as its leadership is opposed to the fundamental policies of Dr. Sun, namely, the policy of effective anti-imperialism, the policies of cooperation of Soviet Russia and the workers and peasants policy.... Now that the three policies had been discarded, our party has again become the tool of militarists and counter-revolutionaries...."

Yet, this article was suppressed by all Chinese newspapers and magazines. Therefore, this statement of protest did not reach the masses who still did not know Soong Ch'ingling's attitude towards Chiang Kai-shek's government at this time.

### C. Return to China

From the moment of her arrival at Peking in early June,



Soong Ch'ing-ling was surrounded by her family and thus was isolated from the ordinary public. Yet, in the long funeral procession from the Western Hills, Peking, the place where Dr. Sun Yat-sen's body was temporarily kept since 1925, to the new burial ground in the Purple Mountain of Nanking Soong Ch'ing-ling tried whenever possible, to keep herself apart from the members of her family. Afterwards, she insisted on returning to her home in Shanghai alone, instead of living in the Soong family as her relatives wanted. By doing this, she hoped to make clear to the public that she had no intention of lending her name and reputation to the defunct Kuomintang and the Nanking government. But as Betty Turner, a correspondent in the Independent Woman observed, her opposition to the Nanking government made life hazardous for her. That she was saved from the fate of other lesser Communists was because of the adoration people held for her.<sup>23</sup> She was in fact virtually a prisoner. Her house was surrounded by guards and everywhere she went she was "accompanied" by a member of her family, an organized system of supervision devised by Chiang Kai-shek to induce Soong Ch'ing-ling to support the government.<sup>24</sup> But she consistently refused to talk to him, and maintained a discreet silence.

For nearly two months after her return to China, Soong Ch'ing-ling refrained from giving public speeches or attacking Chiang Kai-shek's government. This long silence gave hope to the Soong family that they could finally temper Soong Ch'ing-ling and would soon be



able to add her name to the list of supporters of Chiang's regime. After all, family interest and filial piety were still supreme in China and the Nanking government was very much a Soong property.<sup>25</sup> Therefore it was logical at least to the public, that Soong Ch'ing-ling might compromise with Chiang after the climax of her anti-Chiang activities had passed.

Suddenly, on August 1, the date of the formation of Red Army two years earlier in the Manchurian uprising, Soong Ch'ing-ling shattered all the Soong's hope of "taming" her. She sent a cablegram to the Anti-Imperialist League in Berlin as a contribution to the International Anti-war Day. This cablegram caused as great a consternation to Chiang Kai-shek as if Soong Ch'ing-ling had tried to assassinate him. It stated that:

"While the oppressed nationalities today form a solid front against imperialist war and militarism, the reactionary Nanking Government is combining forces with the Imperialists in brutal repressions against the Chinese masses. Never has the treacherous character of the counter-revolutionary Kuomintang leaders been so shamelessly exposed to the world as today. Having betrayed the Nationalist revolution, they have inevitably degenerated into imperialist tools and attempted to provoke war with Russia. But the Chinese masses, undaunted by repression and undeceived by lying propaganda, will fight only on the side of the revolution. Terrorism will only serve to mobilize still broader masses and strengthen our<sup>26</sup> determination to triumph over the present bloody reaction....

The Soong family was thunderstruck and was overwhelmed by this breach of family loyalty. Family pressure was applied to make Soong Ch'ing-ling disclaim all responsibility for the cablegram, but she maintained her position and would not withdraw the statement no matter



what her family did to her. At the same time, no newspapers in China was allowed to publish the cablegram. However, this suppression was again frustrated when someone threw handbills with a Chinese version of the article from the roof of the Sincere Company, one of the highest buildings in the center of Shanghai. When Soong Ch'ing-ling knew of that, she said: "I feel good inside since I sent that telegram. It was necessary to express myself. What happens to me personally as a result is not important."<sup>27</sup>

After sending off the cablegram to the Anti-Imperialist League in Berlin, life became more difficult for her in China. Her house was carefully guarded and her activities were seriously curtailed. Finally, by September, life became so unbearable for her that she decided to have another self-imposed exile in Europe. She wanted to make her position and her difference with the Nanking leaders as clear as possible. She wrote an article in the form of imaginary dialogue between herself and Tai Chi-tau (戴季陶), the leader of the Western Hills Clique and a strong supporter of the Nanking Government. Tai Chi-tau was reported as saying:

"Even if the government had committed a mistake, you had no right to speak openly. You must abide by party discipline. And the worst of it is that the telegram (ie. the cablegram on August 1 to the Anti-Imperialist League) is addressed to foreigners. It amounts to disgracing the government and the people, your own people!"<sup>28</sup>

This criticism that Soong Ch'ing-ling let the foreigners know the "ugly side" of China was prevalent among the old-fashioned minded Chinese especially those who subscribed to the old Chinese saying





that "the shame at home should be hid from outsiders."

To this criticism, Soong Ch'ing-ling replied in the imaginary dialogue:

"Regarding party discipline, I do not belong to your 'party', although I am 'indebted' to you for packing my name on the central executive committee.... Your insinuations are insulting.... no one considers the Nanking government as representative of the Chinese people. I speak for the suppressed masses of China, and you know. The world can easily distinguish whether that foreign body to which I addressed the telegram is friendly or inimical to the interests of the Chinese nation and the people."<sup>29</sup>

Soong Ch'ing-ling's dialogue went on to warn the Kuomintang members not to invoke Dr. Sun's name to sanctify their policies, nor to interpret Dr. Sun as "an idol, an another Confucius and Saint."<sup>30</sup> Tai Chi-tau was also quoted to say:

"Have you failed to notice the great progress made in every department of the government--the reconstruction that is going on, new railway lines proposed that will transform the communication of the country and relieve the people's sufferings? Are they not worthy achievements amid difficult circumstances and obstacles which confronted us?"<sup>31</sup>

To this question, Soong Ch'ing-ling emotionally replied:

"I have noticed nothing but the wanton killing of tens of thousands of revolutionary youths who would one day replace the rotten officials. Nothing but the selfish struggling of the militarists for power, nothing but extortionate taxes upon the already starving masses...I do not demand the absurd, but I do demand that you all stop raising your standard of living. It is already too luxurious, and a million times higher than the average person. Militarists and officials who a few years ago I knew to be poor, are suddenly parading about in fine limousines. Do you think that if Dr. Sun were living he would approve of such a state of affairs?"<sup>32</sup>

In view of the fact that Soong Ch'ing-ling was completely at



odds with her family and waged a battle single-handedly against such a powerful government as the Chiang's, she was remarkable and brave in the fullest sense of the words, especially in a Chinese background where unfortunately, family loyalty had been supreme for thousands of years. Ever since her marriage to Dr. Sun in defiance of her parents, Soong Ch'ing-ling had for many times proved herself to be one who obeyed no one's order but followed her own conscience. Coming from a rich family she had had no experience of poverty until her first exile in Europe in 1927. She was remarkable in deciding to embark upon this uneasy and unstable life of an exile for a second time. As in a Chinese saying, "one who could not be bent by poverty and lowliness or be led astray by affluence is genuinely brave."

#### D. Second Exile and the Struggle for Civil Liberty

According to the study of John Israel, after 1929 there was a growing swing to the left among the students as a result of the Nanking government's indifference to social sufferings.<sup>33</sup> The Japanese encroachment in Manchuria in 1931 and the "Non-policy" of Chiang's government also hastened this process. As a result, youth movements were growing rapidly. Unfortunately, the Nanking government replied with police terror, jailings and killing. This period of development coincided with the second exile of Soong Ch'ing-ling. Indeed she cut short her exile because she felt she could help the persecuted students more by joining the student movement and by helping the arrested have a fair trial. Therefore, she returned to China from Berlin.



early 1931. Using her unique position, Soong Ch'ing-ling joined and organized student campaigns to "resist the Japanese and save the nation." After the Mukden Incident in September 18, 1931, she worked intensively to organize hospitals for the refugees. Never for a moment did she stop opposing Chiang's passiveness in dealing with the Japanese, and his active suppression of the students' patriotic movements. Frustrated by various attempts to plead for a change of policy, Soong Ch'ing-ling, on December 19, 1931, gave out the most severe criticism ever against the Kuomintang in an article, entitled "The Kuomintang is no longer a political power."<sup>34</sup> In this article not only did Soong Ch'ing-ling unveil the atrocity and terrorism of the Kuomintang, she also endorsed, implicitly, a socialist revolution carried out by another mass-supported party. She declared:

"I am therefore compelled to declare frankly, that since the Kuomintang....has failed to carry out the tasks for which it was created, we need express no sorrow for its downfall. I firmly believe that only a revolution built on mass support and for the masses can break the power of militarists and politicians, throw off the yoke of foreign imperialism and truly realize socialism. I am convinced that, despite the terroristic activities carried on by the reactionary forces in power today, millions of true revolutionaries in China will not shrink from their duty, but, urged by the critical situation facing the country, will intensify their work and march on triumphantly toward the goal set by the revolution."<sup>35</sup>

This article was ignored by the Nanking government.

What spurred Soong Ch'ing-ling to a more active role than writing articles, organizing relief works and student movements was the increasing terrorism of the Nanking government. Between November 1929 and March 1932, two secret-police organizations, the Bureau of



Investigation and Statistics of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang and the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics of the Military Affairs Commission (also known as the Blue Shirts) were set up.<sup>36</sup> Literally thousands of young agitators, not necessarily communists, were put into jail and even executed without trial. A joint report by eleven university student organizations, headed by the Hsing Hua Student Association stated;

"Since the moving of the capital (ie. the setting up of Nanking government in 1927), nearly 300,000 youths as reported by various newspapers were slaughtered. Those reported to be missing and imprisoned were so many that even recording was impossible. Not satisfying with killing, they further resort to burial alive....."<sup>37</sup>

Soong Ch'ing-ling recognized the limitation of denouncing the Kuomintang by articles alone. Something concrete had to be done in order to save the thousands of youths who were put into prison "on the flimsiest pretexts and on manufactured evidence,"<sup>38</sup> of Chiang Kai-shek's spies. In December 1932, with the help of Tsai Yuan-pei, Lin Yu-tang, Hu Shih, Yang Chuan and Lu Hsun, the China League for Civil Rights was organized with Soong Ch'ing-ling as chairman. Except Lu Hsun and Yang Chuan, all the other leading organizers of the League were right-winged intellectuals who had the trust of the Kuomintang authorities. This amounted to a clear signal to Chiang that the League was not to be taken as an anti-Chiang organization. Soong Ch'ing-ling took pains to make clear the aims and the nature of the League so that it would gain toleration from the Nanking government. In the very beginning of the League's





manifesto, written by Soong Ch'ing-ling, it stated:

"It is absolutely necessary to be clear on the character of the China League for Civil Rights. The League is not a political party. It does not aim to lead the political or economic struggle of the Chinese masses, and consequently does not aim at leadership of the struggle for the conquest of political power."<sup>39</sup>

Furthermore, the manifesto made clear that the primary concern of the League was to help the innocent; in Soong Ch'ing-ling's words, "the masses of unknown and nameless prisoners."<sup>40</sup>

The aims of the League were clearly stated as:

1. to fight for the liberation of political prisoners and to fight the system of torture.
2. to have fair trials and fair treatment for all political prisoners.
3. to struggle for civil rights, rights of organization, speech, press and assembly.<sup>41</sup>

The composition of the organization and the limited platform of the China League for Civil Liberties offered no ground for its suppression by the Nanking government even if the Kuomintang was suspicious of the league. However, Soong Ch'ing-ling was shrewd enough to know that the Nanking government had the power and will to crush the League if it became too much of an embarrassment for Chiang Kai-shek. The only way to guarantee the continuing existence of the League was to downgrade its political role but to display as much as possible its humanitarian nature, which no Chinese government proclaiming to rule according to Confucian ethics could openly refute. In a press conference in December, she declared, in the vaguest non-political term as possible, that the League was for "the advancement



of human society," and the chief concern was "to assist the masses of unknown and nameless political prisoners."<sup>42</sup>

The China League For Civil Rights was quite effective in the months following its formation in December 1932. As a result of the League's intervention, many innocent student agitators were freed. Sometimes, Soong Ch'ing-ling was even able to seek the release of Communists. The most notable case concerned the release of Liao Cheng-chih (son of Liao Chung-kai), Lo Teng-hsian, Chen-keng and two others. The group were arrested in the French Concession of Shanghai, and were extradicted from the French concession to be put on trial. They were accused of being Communist Party members and engaged in "counter-revolutionary" activities, but the Nanking authority could provide no evidence except the words of police informers.<sup>43</sup> With the help of the press and picketing students, and with much behind the scene arguments with high Kuomintang officials, the accused were released.

Soong Ch'ing-ling's fight for civil rights was not only limited to China. Being an idealistic revolutionary herself, she embraced all revolutionaries. When news about the maltreatment of Jews and literary men by the Nazi storm-troops reached her, she filed a protest against this gross injustice. An article, entitled "A Denunciation of the Persecution of German Progressives and the Jewish People," was published in Shanghai. The conclusion of this long article was especially illustrative of her disgust of all sorts



of injustice and terror. It stated, rather emotionally:

"In the name of the human, social and cultural advancement of mankind, and in an effort to help preserve the social and cultural achievements of men and movements, the China League for Civil Rights protest in the most energetic manner against these facts, reports of which are duplicated in all the press of Europe and America. We protest against this fearful terror against the German working-class and progressive thinkers, a terror which is crippling the social, intellectual and cultural life of Germany."

However, the League's frequent intervention proved too much of an embarrassment to the Nanking government. Professing to rule according to old Chinese ethics, the Nanking government found it difficult not to release some of its political prisoners on humanitarian grounds, upon the League's intervention. The only way out was to put some of the important political prisoners to death immediately after they were arrested, for any open court hearing were bound to lead to interventions from the League. This was exactly the case when a League of left wing writers was broken up in 1932 in Shanghai. The League was headed by Lu Hsun. Because of his personal fame, he did not receive much physical torture and was later freed. However six of the "lesser" writers, including the talented woman novelist, Feng Kung, were made to dig their own graves, were bound and buried alive. Among many of her failures, this one saddened Soong Ch'ing-ling most. Later, she discussed this with Edgar Snow, and remarked rather sarcastically, "that is our Christian Generalissimo--burying our best young people alive. Evidently in his Bible studies he has not yet reached the Corinthians.... If Dr. Sun were alive today, he would disown and dissolve the Kuomintang rather than see it used to sanctify



the murder of writers and patriots."<sup>45</sup>

The China League for Civil Rights was too embarrassing to enable it to last long. In November 1934, Dr. Yang Chuan, a western educated scientist and member of the China's League for Civil right was assassinated by a Kuomintang gunman. Lin Yu-tang found out that Yang Chuan was actually killed by Tu Yueh-shang's gunmen on Chiang Kai-shek's orders. Lin Yu-tang, fearing for his own life, then resigned from the League followed by most of the other members. The League was therefore dissolved. Soong Ch'ing-ling was left alone in the fight for civil liberties. While all members of the League remained silent, Soong Ch'ing-ling wrote another article on the death of Yang Chuan, saying that torture and killing could never stop the struggle for freedom, of which process, the China League for Civil Rights was only a segment. She further declared that the death of Yang Chuan could not crush the struggle for freedom, but would inspire more dedication for the struggle "until events develop to their logical conclusion."<sup>46</sup>





## CHAPTER IV

SOONG CH'ING-LING 1933-1949

### A. China in the early thirties

The Nationalist government appeared to enter a low trough in the thirties. The victory over the leftists, the temporary elimination of the Communists, and the apparent success of unification in the twenties presented a strong contrast to the Japanese aggrandizement, the famines and the dislocated economy of the thirties. The immediate difficulty facing Chiang Kai-shek's government was the every growing ambition of the Japanese. Since the Mukden Incident, September 18, 1931, the whole nation especially the students were swept into the mood of a military resistance. But Chiang Kai-shek, being the highest military commander of his armies, knew clearly that a war with the Japanese would be disastrous to his government. Such a military confrontation would benefit the already hard-pressed Chinese Communists who would receive a reprieve from Chiang Kai-shek's best troops. Chiang Kai-shek therefore chose the easiest, yet the most irresponsible way. He turned the whole thorny Manchurian problem over to the League of Nations. The failure of the League to impose any effective sanctions upon the Japanese aggression exposed the weakness of Chiang Kai-shek's policy.<sup>1</sup> Soong Ch'ing-ling in 1933, in an article entitled "Workers of China, Unite!", ridiculed Chiang's useless appeal to the League. She stated that as long as the powers' interests in China were not



challenged directly by the Japanese, the League would give Japan a free-hand in her military ventures in China. Therefore, Chiang's turning to the powers for help was not only traitorous but a useless policy. China should look inside herself for an effective resistance against the invaders. The workers and the peasants were China's real sources of strength.<sup>2</sup>

What embarrassed Chiang Kai-shek more were the Japanese actions after the Manchurian Incident. Late in 1932, to avenge the anti-Japanese boycott and anti-Japanese demonstrations, the Japanese sought to quieten the protestors by a show of force in Shanghai. To pursue further her interest, Japan occupied Jehol in 1934 and threatened to detach the five northern provinces from China to create a North China autonomous state. The fact that Chiang Kai-shek was unwilling to fight Japan, left him no choice but to concede to Japanese demands.<sup>3</sup> By a series of treaties, the Tanghu in 1933 and the Ho-Umetzu of June 1935, Chiang Kai-shek gave up practically all what the Japanese had demanded, save political recognition of the autonomous state of North China. Even the vital Hopei and the Chahar provinces were under Japanese military control. In 1936, the Nanking government officially agreed to prohibit strikes in Japanese factories lest they jeopardize the "friendly relationship" between China and Japan. The student body in China was infuriated by this policy of concession. Student demonstrations were common in the early and middle thirties. Under the pretext that the demonstrations were Communist inspired, the Nationalist



government did not hesitate to use armed troops to suppress these demonstrations. The most famous case was that of the December Ninth (1935) movement, which the Communist now view as the turning point of the resistance movement.<sup>4</sup> Despite the presence of troops armed with machine-guns and the Blue Shirts, the all powerful secret police, the students demanded a united effort to resist the Japanese. Chiang Kai-shek expressed that his "heart" was pained by these students who had "fallen prey to Communism"<sup>5</sup> and the Blue Shirts soon extended the "white terror" from the Communists to the pursuit of all those who criticized the regime, especially intellectuals and students in the universities. However, Chiang's allegation that the December 9th movement and other student movements in the thirties were Communist inspired appeared groundless. Even the Communist Party, which was apt to claim credit for such movements, lamented at their inability to lead such an important step toward national awakening, as the December 9th movement. Mao wrote of this event, "the strangest thing of all was that the Communist Party was in an utterly defenseless position in all the cultural institutions in the Kuomintang controlled areas."<sup>6</sup>

### 3. Soong Ch'ing-ling and the United Front

Long before the students' demands in December, 1935, for an all out effort to resist Japan, similar demands for unity and for the cessation of the civil war in order to confront Japan had already



been advocated by the Chinese communists and by Soong Ch'ing-ling. After a symbolical declaration of war against Japan in April 1932, the Kiangsi Soviet followed this up by a formal proposal, signed by Mao Tse-tung, Chu-teh (朱德), Hsiang Ying (向英), and Chang Kuo-tao (張國燾) in January 1933, indicating their willingness to make an alliance with other non-communist groups to save China from Japanese aggression.<sup>7</sup> This proposal soon materialized into an anti-Japanese military alliance between the Red Army, Feng Yu-hsiang (馮玉祥) and Tang Chen-wu (方振武) in May of the same year. Immediately after this, to the embarrassment of the Nationalist government, the hope of the common people for a cease fire between the Communists and the Nationalist government ran high.

Soong Ch'ing-ling, however, was shrewd enough to know that the Kuomintang would not agree to a cease fire while it remained militarily the stronger party. Therefore, what Soong Ch'ing-ling had in mind in 1933 was a "United-Front of the masses": the workers and the peasants. This United-Front of the masses would bring concerted pressure upon the Nationalist government to form a real national United-Front against the Japanese.<sup>8</sup> Soong Ch'ing-ling urged this preliminary "United-Front of the masses" to demand the following from the government as a first step for the formation of a national united-Front:

1. at least 80% of the armed forces, with adequate equipment and airplanes, be sent against Japan to regain Manchuria and Jehol:





2. people be armed and voluntary military detachments be formed;
3. democratic rights, including free speech, free press, right of assembly and organization be granted, torture and killing of revolutionaries be ceased;
4. fighting against the Communist occupied areas be stopped.<sup>9</sup>

It was clear to everyone that the Kuomintang would not comply with these four demands if it could avoid it. Therefore, Soong Ch'ing-ling proposed the following "tactics" to put pressure on the Kuomintang.

"We must organize in every factory, every school and university, every city and village. Our demands must flood the streets. Only by arousing the masses to the task of the future, will we bring action. This action will be broad and anti-imperialist struggle culminating in the national revolutionary war of the armed people against Japanese and other imperialism."<sup>10</sup>

The subtlety of Soong Ch'ing-ling's proposal is that the "United-Front of the masses" had another function besides forcing the Kuomintang into a national United-Front against Japan. Soong Ch'ing-ling made it very clear that the united-front would also be used to spearhead the struggle for political freedom of the toiling masses. These two functions of the United-Front were clearly stated in the same article:

"I call upon all men and women, the youth of China, especially the workers, peasants, students and volunteers, to unite and organize this struggle for the liberation, unity and integrity of China, a struggle inseparably bound up with the efforts for the emancipation of the toiling masses from exploitation, with the fight for the rights of free speech, free press, assembly and organization and for the liberation of political prisoners. Only through such effort will be developed the unconquerable national and social forces which will break the power of imperialism and its treacherous allies."<sup>11</sup>



Obviously, "treacherous allies of imperialism" stood for all the privileged classes, the unjust system and practices that helped sustain the imperialist interests in China. Therefore it should be clear that what Soong Ch'ing-ling had in mind was a United-Front from below for both a national "salvation" against the powers and a social and political revolution which would give freedom to the people, which also meant the eventual overthrow of the Kuomintang government.

Besides writing articles, which little effect on the Chinese masses because of the tight censorship, Soong Ch'ing-ling also actively organized various conferences in the French Concession in Shanghai. The most important one was a meeting in September 1933 of the World Committee Against Imperialist War, a leftist organization which grew out of the Anti-war Congress held at Amsterdam in August 1932. In a statement she issued a month prior to the convention, she made clear that all anti-Japanese elements "including the local Kuomintang branches" were welcomed to the conference.<sup>12</sup> That was one of the first active steps taken to organize a United-Front of the masses

It is interesting to note that seldom since the fall of the Hankow government in 1927 had Soong Ch'ing-ling been so broad in her appeal, so sweeping in scope, and so neutral in class terminology, as in this statement. Her appeal for a mass based United-Front transcended political party lines. Yet, no Kuomintang members showed up for the Shanghai Anti-war Congress. Even neutral, non-partisan personalities were scarce in the Congress. Soong Ch'ing-ling attributed the poor



show-up at the meeting to "the terror and interference of the imperialist and Kuomintang authorities."<sup>13</sup>

Nevertheless, this poorly attended Anti-war Congress on September 30, 1933 provides us with substantial information to show the changes in the political thinking of Soong Ch'ing-ling. In her main address to the Anti-war Congress, she analyzed the world situation strictly along the line of Communist ideology. She regarded the critical situation in the world as the result of the capitalists' "redivision of world markets"<sup>14</sup> and capitalism would fail because it had "brought forward the class destined to smash it--the proletariat". The war-like situations in 1933 marked the "birth of a new system of socialism".<sup>15</sup> Although her analysis of the world situation and her knowledge of Marxism might seem naive and shallow, such an address, dotted with Marxist terminology, represented quite a departure from Soong Ch'ing-ling's previous utterances couched in Sun Yat-sen's ideas. It can be assumed therefore that in 1931, she was completely on the side of the left.

Besides analyzing the world situation, she also ridiculed the idea, prevalent among the Kuomintang officials, that Japan was too strong for China to take on in 1933. She said, "armies are not the only decisive factor, ideas also have a role to play".<sup>16</sup> Obviously, Soong Ch'ing-ling did not believe that Japan would be able to conquer China.

But the nature of the ties between Soong Ch'ing-ling and the



Chinese Communist Party at this time was still unclear. There is no question that she had regarded the Chinese Communists as the true inheritors of Sun Yat-sen's ideas. But whether she had worked in the thirties as a spokesman of the Chinese Communists, especially in the struggle for a United-Front is debatable. The most concrete evidence that Soong Ch'ing-ling worked in close conjunction with the Chinese Communist party in this period is a six-point program for a resistance war against Japan, which she and Ho Hsiang-ning issued on April 20, 1934. This six-point program was entitled the "Basic Program of the Chinese People for Fighting Japan", a publication of the Council of the Chinese people for Self-Defense, which Soong Ch'ing-ling had chaired and organized with a group of the former Left-Kuomintang members.<sup>17</sup> This article called upon the Chinese people to launch a "holy war" against Japan and to confiscate Japan's two billion worth of investments in China.<sup>18</sup> The strange thing is that this article published by Soong Ch'ing-ling was collected as a party document by a Communist historian in an official publication in 1951.<sup>19</sup> Even Mao Tse-tung hinted that this six point program was really a Communist declaration, issued under the signature of Soong Ch'ing-ling because of her greater influence in areas held by the Kuomintang.<sup>20</sup> But some scholars, such as Shanti Swarup, are quick to point out the basic difference between Soong Ch'ing-ling's article and the official one that the Chinese Communist published ten days earlier. While both documents called for general mobilization and tacitly, for the first





time, did not hint at the overthrow of the Kuomintang as a goal of the United-Front. Soong Ch'ing-ling's article, differed sharply from the Communist document, in urging the people to develop "friendly relations", at least temporarily, with other imperialist powers which had maintained a "benevolent neutrality" in the Sino-Japanese conflict.<sup>21</sup>

The truth, likely, is that by 1934, the Chinese Communists, as well as Soong Ch'ing-ling, recognized the futility of advocating a united-front from below at this critical time. Also, the benevolent attitude of other imperialists would be very much needed if the united-front was to be effective against the Japanese. But it would be embarrassing to the Communists to advocate such a policy. Probably, as an expedient, Soong Ch'ing-ling, who had maintained a steady understanding with the Chinese Communists, was asked to author the document. It is also safe to assume that Soong Ch'ing-ling would not allow her name to be signed to a document with which she did not agree. It is interesting to note that Soong Ch'ing-ling had abandoned her idea of a United-Front from below for the sake of reality; and advocated instead a United-Front both from below and above.

The six-point program issued by Soong Ch'ing-ling immediately drew reaction from the chief editor of the Nichi-Nichi Shinbun, a leading Japanese newspaper in Shanghai. He sent Soong Ch'ing-ling a letter, charging that the six-point declaration was "an intrigue born of discontent with the Japanese policy of the Nanking government, aimed at achieving your ambition of an alliance with Soviet Russia."<sup>22</sup>



To this accusation, Soong Ch'ing-ling replied that "it was not necessary for any patriotic Chinese to look further than Yangtzepoo and Kiangwan to realize the real import of Japan's hypocritically and piously uttered desire to maintain peace in the Far East." She also stated with irony that "some true and best representatives of the Japanese people" were members of the Council of the Chinese people for Self-Defense.<sup>23</sup>

Soong Ch'ing-ling's six-point program also gave a great stimulation to the student movements which had remained partially dormant since the creation of two secret police organizations by the Nationalist government in 1929 and 1932. The rebirth of student movements, especially after the December Ninth movement in 1934 in turn, had great impact upon the development of the United-Front. The students were quick to organize conferences and discussion groups advocating a united effort to fight against the Japanese encroachments. Further Japanese incursions into North China in the following year led to a proliferation of student organizations similar to the Council of the Chinese People for Self-Defense, and in 1936, all these various organizations were grouped together into the National Salvation Association to put greater pressure upon the government and for maximum influence with the public. Naturally, Soong Ch'ing-ling, being the idol of the students, was elected to the Executive Committee of the All-China Federation of National Salvation Associations.

This student based National Salvation Association turned out to be an invaluable asset to the Communists. Because the Kuomintang



remained unresponsive to the students' pleas for a united-front, they began to shift more and more to the left and eventually accepted the Chinese Communist Party as a spiritual leader in the national salvation.

The greatest shortcoming of the Nationalist government was their total incomprehension of the mood of the people. Embarrassed by the ever growing demand for a United-Front, the Nationalist government tried to quiet the students and the writers through imprisonment. In November, 1936, seven leading members of the National Salvation Association were arrested for their persistent advocacy of a united-front against Japan. These seven leaders were charged with Communist activities, a crime which could bring death. The "Seven Gentlemen's case," the name attributed to the arrest, immediately initiated a new round of denunciation of the National government, and the seven men were widely regarded as martyrs. Soong Ch'ing-ling considered the arrests to be inspired by the Japanese authorities in Nanking, because, according to her, the Shanghai Mainichi, (a Japanese newspaper) had prior knowledge of the arrest.<sup>24</sup> In a statement published on November 26, she reaffirmed that the nature of the National Salvation Association "is neither pro-Communist nor anti-Government"; and its sole aim "is for a United Front of all people, regardless of their political beliefs or party affiliations, for a national war of liberation."<sup>25</sup> In this way, she tacitly indicated that the charge of Communist activities laid on the "Seven Gentlemen" had no basis at all. In July, 1937, Soong Ch'ing-ling organized a "sit-down strike" in the Kiangsu High



Court in Soochow. She led a group of eleven youths to the compound and asked to be arrested because they showed similar "belief and behavior" to the Seven Gentlemen.

### C. The Sian Incident and the United-Front

By the end of 1935, the war between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang had undergone a dramatic change. Chiang Kai-shek, with the help of German military advisers led by General Von Seeckt, and with the support of aircraft and artillery, finally drove the Chinese Communists out from Chingkanshan. The Red Army embarked on the famous Long March to Shensi. They arrived a year later in October, 1935, with scarcely 20,000 soldiers left, about a fifth of the total number that had begun the Long March. Despite the turning of the scales, the Chinese Communists in Shensi were safer than before. North China had never been under the direct military control of the Kuomintang, although in theory, the whole of China had been united under the Kuomintang rule since 1928. In other words, the well-equipped and well-trained troops of Chiang Kai-shek could no longer be used to fight the Communists. Chiang had to rely on Chang Hsüeh-liang's North-east Army and Yang Hu-chang's North-west Army for the suppression of the Communists. Chang Hsüeh-liang was made the Deputy Commander-in-chief for the suppression of the Communists, but his troops were mostly Manchurian peasants, and had long been discontented with Chiang Kai-shek's policy of non-resistance to the Japanese. Even Chiang Hsüeh-





liang was sympathetic to the Communist plea for a United-Front. In the summer of 1936, without the knowledge of Chiang Kai-shek, he had gone to Yen-an to hold talks with Chou En-lai.<sup>26</sup> Since then, there was a secret understanding between Chang Hsüeh-liang and the Chinese Communists. Fighting between the two armies were but shows put on for Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang was dissatisfied with Chang Hsüeh-liang's poor results in communist suppression and flew to Sian in December, 1936, to organize an extermination campaign against the Communists. There, he was taken prisoner by Chang Hsüeh-liang "in order to persuade" Chiang Kai-shek to subscribe to the united-front policy. Though the details of this "military persuasion" still remains murky, the Sian Incident resulted in a sort of modus vivendi between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang for a joint effort against Japan. The first concrete sign of the temporary truce between the two enemies was the abolition of the Bandit Suppression Headquarters in Sian on January 6, 1937.<sup>27</sup> Talks between Chou En-lai and T.V. Soong, who represented the Nationalist government began soon after Chiang Kai-shek's return to Nanking. But progress on the United-Front was still slow, even after the Communist party gave four major concessions on February, 10. viz:

1. cease all efforts to overthrow the National Government;
2. Rename the Soviet Government as the government of the "special region" of the Republic of China; and the Red Army would be re-designated as a unit of the National Revolutionary Army;



3. a democratic system of government based on universal suffrage would be instituted in the special regions; and
4. confiscation of landlords' land would be stopped.<sup>28</sup>

The slow progress in the realization of a solid united-front worried Soong Ch'ing-ling. Taking the opportunity of a meeting of the Plenum of the KMT Executive Committee in February 18, she travelled to Nanking and delivered a blistering attack on the Kuomintang's half-heartedness in a speech addressed to the Third Planning Session. The attack was directed at Chiang Kai-shek's policy of internal pacification before resistance. She said:

"How ridiculous it is to hear today the antiquated theory that first we must suppress the Communists and then resist Japanese aggression! Shall we go to war with one arm broken? We have had ten years of experience in civil wars, when the country's energies have been wasted on internal strife and the country devastated while Japanese militarists were slicing off one piece after another of our territory.... It is evident that Chinese must not fight against their own brothers. They know it is against the interest of the nation. Every internal conflict can and must be solved peacefully and amicably. There must be no civil wars. There must be peace and unity. We must speedily build up Chinese national defence against foreign aggression."<sup>29</sup>

Soong Ch'ing-ling followed up this attack with another two months later when no concrete steps of reconciliation had been taken after the end of the civil war. This time, she attacked the New Life Movement, the cultural policy which the Nationalist government devised in 1934 as a competitive program to combat the influence of the Communist ideology among the peasants. The movement's primary aim was to seek revival of the Confucian ethics as the basis of a



stable social and political order. In "Confucianism and Modern China", Soong Ch'ing-ling denounced the government's policy as a "fruitless and futile" attempt "to turn back the clock of history" and was purely "reaction disguised as concern for social order." She therefore proposed to replace the New Life Movement by "a great campaign to improve people's livelihood through the improvement of methods of production."<sup>30</sup>

Meanwhile all disputes between the Communists and the Kuomintang, and between the Kuomintang and Soong Ch'ing-ling were swept aside when the Japanese began their large scale war on China on July 7, 1937.

#### D. Soong Ch'ing-ling during the War of Resistance 1937-1945

As the old wounds between the Nationalist government and all her critics were temporarily healed by the Japanese attack the Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge), Soong Ch'ing-ling also stopped her attack on the government. She even praised Chiang Kai-shek for stopping the civil war at the most critical hour.<sup>31</sup> In many articles, she stressed the spirit of unity that prevailed during the first year of the war. A consistent theme of all her articles and speeches written in the beginning three years of the war was the final "victory" of China. These articles were clearly to instill confidence in the Chinese people, even though China suffered severe losses in nearly every encounter with the Japanese armies. "China Unconquerable" was a typical example of her articles in this period. In this long



article, written in August, 1937, she gave an extensive survey of Japan's economic and social structure and concluded,

"Japanese economic and social conditions are not robust enough for a long war. And certainly, the Japanese militarists cannot hope to conquer China in a war of short duration..... With the spontaneous desire of the Chinese people to mobilize themselves, with China's immensely vast territory, rich in natural resources, with a population of 475,000,000 people, the might of Japan becomes a mere paper tiger..... China could not be defeated even if she had to fight Japan single-handed."<sup>32</sup>

Her faith in the final victory was amazing in view of the fact that nearly all the vital ports and the coastline fell into Japanese hands in only a few month's time.

Even before the United-front took definite shape in August 1937, Soong Ch'ing-ling had already plunged into the war effort. In August and September, she journeyed to Canton to promote women's patriotic associations and began to integrate them into the war effort, helping them and directing them to organize various medical units, relief organizations and orphanages. In her spare work of organizing the traditionally passive women into the war effort, Soong Ch'ing-ling received much help from the elderly, but more experienced, Ho Hsiang-ning (lme. Liao Chung-kai) who, at the age of sixty-four, had organized the Kuomintang Women's Department.

After Shanghai fell to the Japanese in November, 1937, Soong Ch'ing-ling went to Hong Kong and organized one of the most important organizations for the war effort. In June 1938, with help from many friends, such as Edgar Snow, she organized the China Defense League.





To symbolize the KMT- CCP United-Front, the organization included many Kuomintang dignitaries, such as T.V. Soong. The League's intention was to provide a centralized organization for the most needed war zones. The league was most effective in obtaining funds from overseas Chinese and the China Aid Council in the United States. Many foreign medical teams went to serve in the Communist bases through the intermediary of the League. Dr. Norman Bethune was one of the more notable cases.

During her almost four years in Hong Kong, from June 1938 to December 1941, she kept a steady contact with the Chinese Communist Party through Ho Hsiang-ning's son and daughter, Liao Ch'eng-chih and Liao Heng-hsing, both of whom were Communists. Therefore, she recognized more of the needs and grievances of the Chinese Communists. Also, she knew, as early as the end of 1938, that her confidence in the United-front was totally unfounded. Her early jubilant declarations of the hard-won unity, such as "all internal conflicts have ceased voluntarily; all dissension have also disappeared before the threat of foreign aggression,"<sup>33</sup> were almost to be the direct opposite of the reality.

In early 1939, the United-Front was completely dead except in name. The United-Front being an expedient forced upon the Nationalist government by the capture of Chiang Kai-shek, never took root as integral part of the Nationalist policies. In fact, Chiang Kai-shek never changed his view of the Communists. When the prestige of the



Communists rose considerably and the territory increased, they again became the number one enemy of the Nationalists. After all, an internal enemy is more dangerous than an external one. In fact, Chiang Kai-shek would have been happy to see the Communists destroyed by the Japanese, something he was never able to do. In 1939, Chiang Kai-shek imposed a blockade on the Communists. His best troops were massed to blockade the Red Army bases, in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsha Border region, hoping that the Communist expansion would be curbed. Whether this would benefit the anti-Japanese war effort was only secondary. Soon the military and medical supplies to which the Chinese Communists were entitled according to the agreement of the United-Front, were cut off. Medical donations, ear-marked for the Communists by various volunteer organizations, were confiscated on various grounds. The most famous case was the Sanyuan Confiscation which became one of the symbols of the Kuomintang's betrayal of the United-Front during the war.<sup>34</sup> Later even physicians who volunteered to go to the "red" areas were denied access. When the China Defense League sent Dr. Erwin Kirch to replace Dr. Norman Bethune who died of blood poisoning in 1939, he was turned back by blockading armies.<sup>35</sup> All these uncooperative activities of the Nationalist government and the oppressive hounding of students and leftists after 1939 did not escape the notice of Soong Ch'ing-ling, who became convinced that the honey moon between the Kuomintang and the communists was over. The Kuomintang had indeed reverted to its old reactionary policies toward dissenters.



Criticisms of the Kuomintang again appeared in Soong Ch'ing-ling's articles and speeches. Her criticisms of the Kuomintang were aimed at dissuasion of the government, and her war efforts gradually geared to help out the hard-pressed Communists. In fact, throughout the years of the war of resistance, the most memorable work, and the most distinguished work of Soong Ch'ing-ling was her efforts to preserve this precarious United-Front. This was especially the case after 1939 when she was disillusioned with the sincerity of the government's desire to defeat the foreign aggressor. Nevertheless, her criticisms of the government were "mild" comparing with those she made before the war, lest they would further endanger the fragile "unity" between the government and the Chinese Communist Party. Though many of her criticisms were couched in allusions, her disillusionment with the government seems clear.

The first indication of her dissatisfaction with the conditions of the United-Front, come in a speech delivered before a gathering of women in Hong Kong on International Women's Day on March 8, 1939. The article was entitled "An appeal for aid to Partisan Fighters." Her appeal to aid the partisan fighters alone amounted to an allusion that the Communists did not obtain the full share of supplies that they were entitled to according to the terms of the United-Front. After outlining the fact that the main force of Japan was not engaging the Nationalist armies, but was fighting the Communist partisan fighters, she went on to espouse the importance of the United-Front. She said,



"This unity is the chief obstacle that our enemy has to face, and the Tokyo militarists know it. Time and again, they and their agents have tried to weaken our resistance... by cunning offers of "compromise", the real aim of which is the subjugation of our beloved country. They have tried to split us by creating dissensions among us and by trying to revive those which existed in the past by provoking differences between the Kuomintang and Communist parties."<sup>36</sup>

By saying that Japan had tried to revive the differences between the Kuomintang and the Communists, she underscored the existence of renewed differences between the two partners of the United-Front. Also, by indicating that the unity was the chief obstacle to Japan's victory Soong Ch'ing-ling subtly pointed out that those in the Kuomintang hierarchy who cared to revive the difference between the Communists had, in fact, fallen prey to Japan's plot.

But the greatest danger to the United-Front was the political of the future of China. By the end of 1939, two years after the beginning of the war, doubt began to be felt as to the prospect of Japan's victory over China. The question soon arose in the minds of many of the Kuomintang officials of what would become of the relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party after the war. The increase in prestige and strength of the Chinese Communist Party in the war precipitated the question whether China would "go red" after the war. The Nationalist government leaders were not so naive to believe that the Communists would ever discard their ideal of socializing China. So a contest of power with the Communists was a real prospect. If the Nationalists were unable to annihilate the weaker Communist





Party before the war, it would be even more difficult to take on the Communists after the war with Japan. Therefore, by 1939, to curb the growth of the Communists was at least as high a priority to the KMT as to fight against the Japanese. A military blockade was imposed around the "liberated areas" held by the Communists. Harassment extended to forcing the Chinese Red Cross Medical Relief Corps not to treat Communist soldiers.<sup>37</sup> Critics and those who dared to voice the true state of affairs were imprisoned. Even a neutralist, such as Dr. Ma Ying-chu (馬寅初), the noted economist from Yale University, was arrested for revealing the messy financial situation of the government.<sup>38</sup> All these ominous signs deeply worried Soong Ch'ing-ling. The breaking of the United-Front at this time would undoubtedly hurt the war effort. To prevent this, it was necessary to calm the fear of the Kuomintang leaders.

Soong Ch'ing-ling not only constantly reminded the Kuomintang leaders of the importance of the United-Front during the war of resistance, but she went one step further by advocating an ideal political system after the war. "When China Wins", an essay she published in 1939, was the most representative view on the ideal political system.

"....the unity of the Chinese nation in the present struggle will continue after our victory in a united effort for national reconstruction and the realization of the San Min Chu-I, the Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen, which the Kuomintang and the Communists recognize as a common national program."<sup>39</sup>

Then she went on to say that the republic formed after the war would



be a democratic one, with the central government responsible to a broadly elected National Assembly. The relations between the central government and the provinces would be drastically changed, and the provinces be no more than administrative divisions. This arrangement was clearly designed to curb the revival of warlords. The armies would also be reorganized and its numbers severely curtailed.<sup>40</sup>

With hindsight, Soong Ch'ing-ling's "democratic republic" was merely a product of wishful thinking. The Kuomintang was not prepared to adopt any form of government which would curtail its power. The Chinese Communist Party was equally unwilling to accept any political program which would not eventually give them ultimate power to socialize China. But since Soong Ch'ing-ling was, at that time, the unofficial go-between between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, this democratic republic gave an impression that it was really what the Communist had envisaged after the war. China would not "go Red in some sudden, violent and mysterious fashion."<sup>41</sup> Whether this article of Soong Ch'ing-ling did indeed calm the Kuomintang's fear of the "red" menace is difficult to assess. However the intent of this article was undoubtedly to preserve the United-Front or at least to delay its total collapse at this critical time.

But the relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang continued to deteriorate. In 1939, not only was there a growing retreat from the freedoms of the beginning of the war, but for the Kuomintang tightened the repression by passing a series of acts,



mainly to hamstring the activities of the Chinese Communist Party.

They were:

- (a) Measures to restrict the Activities of Alien Parties;
- (b) Measures to deal with the Communist Problem;
- (c) Measures for guarding against Communist activities in the Japanese occupied areas.<sup>42</sup>

By early 1940, pronouncements of the two parties became increasingly bitter and accusatory. The New Fourth Army Incident of January 1941, when the Kuomintang army of about 30,000 annihilated the unprepared 5000 strong New Fourth Army of the Communists was a bombshell in the already strained KMT-CCP relationship. Accusations from both sides in the months following became more and more severe. It looked as though the United-Front would collapse in any time and open conflict between the two parties would resume. Soong Ch'ing-ling could wait no longer. In October 1941, when she was still in Hong Kong, occupying herself with the affairs of China's Defense League, she gave out one of the most severe criticism on the Kuomintang since the beginning of the war. As usual, her criticism of the Kuomintang was set out in a long article, entitled "China Needs More Democracy" which was ironically dedicated to the "National Anti-Japanese United-Front."<sup>43</sup> She blamed the military conflicts between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party on the lack of "democratic representation....in the administration of the war,"<sup>44</sup> and therefore all sorts of disputes must be solved by resorting to violence. Since



the Kuomintang was the ruling party and Chiang Kai-shek was the Generalissimo, this accusation was undoubtedly another way of saying that Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorial policy caused the open conflicts between the two parties. Also, Soong Ch'ing-ling went on to refute the Kuomintang's most handy reason for not granting military democracy, that it would hinder military efficiency. She stated:

"China's lack of democracy is valuable only to fifth columnists and potential compromisers and appeasers. By no stretch of the imagination could the granting of democratic rights impede China's prosecution of the war. On the contrary, our people overwhelmingly support the struggle against Japan, and hence, the suppression of their initiative is definitely harmful. For the sake of war, for the sake of the United-Front that makes our resistance possible, our countrymen and our friends abroad should support the demand for increased democracy in our country."<sup>45</sup>

But Soong Ch'ing-ling's criticism had practically no effect on the KMT. The relation between the KMT and CCP continued to worsen.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941 had also implications for China. The American involvement in Asia precluded any Japanese victory and would definitely shorten the war. Therefore, the final contest between the KMT and the CCP assumed some sort of an immediate reality. The reason why an all-out contest between the two parties did not develop at this time was perhaps because neither party wanted to bear the responsibility for the "crime" of breaking the unity, especially when the war was still going on. Soong Ch'ing-ling was greatly discouraged by the prospect of a civil war. For the remaining years of the war, she continued her criticism of the Chiang





government especially for its lack of democracy, which she thought was the root of all disputes. In every speech she delivered and in every article she wrote in the remaining years of the war, she talked of a constitutional government based on democratic election, as the first step for a national reconstruction. She also criticized nearly all aspects of the Nationalist social, economic and political policies. In 1944, when the American Vice-president, Henry A. Wallace, visited Chungking, the war time capital, Soong Ch'ing-ling personally told him about the "undemocratic conditions" and the corruption of the government. Also her various encounters with the Kuomintang government in the war years led the American ambassador in Chungking to report in 1944 that there was "much private comment among independent Chinese and some minor officials" about the "repressive methods to stifle opposition, suspicion of all elements considered critical of the Kuomintang and centralization of power in the hands of the Central Government." But "no Chinese of any importance has dared to voice publicly even by implication to the existence of such conditions except Madame Sun."<sup>45</sup>

#### B. Soong Ch'ing-ling and the Civil War

Henry Wallace's visit to China led to a series of American mediation efforts between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. The first was undertaken by Major General Patrick J. Hurley and then Lt. General Albert C. Wedemeyer and General Marshall. How-



ever, all these missions failed miserably. The crux of the difference between the KMT and the CCP was revealed as early as 1944, in a meeting between Chiang Kai-shek and Wallace. Chiang Kai-shek demanded no less than complete control of the Communist Army and its territories in return for the grant of political amnesty and the right to continue to exist as a political party.<sup>47</sup> But the Communist Party was determined not to turn over its territories nor the administration of the Red Army to the central government, unless the National government and the National Military Council were reorganized to accommodate Communist membership.<sup>48</sup> In short, the Kuomintang determined to maintain its military dictatorship and the Chinese Communist Party was equally determined not to give up its military power unless a coalition government was formed. There was absolutely no meeting ground and the relation between the two parties turned from bad to worse as the war approached an end.

Both parties were unprepared for the sudden Japanese surrender. With the passing of the first jubilant mood of victory, the shadow of a civil war loomed large. The Kuomintang, still holding the reins of government, with superiority in armed forces and with the possibility of American backing, was almost pleased with the prospect of an earlier contest with the "Communist bandits". The political survival of the Kuomintang could only be guaranteed by the speedy defeat of the Chinese Communist Party. The longer the war continued, the greater the support the Communists could expect to enjoy from the land



hungry peasants, unless the Kuomintang carried out Sun Yat-sen's "Land to the tillers" program, which, up to that point they were unable or unwilling to do.

The negotiation period (1945-46) between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party coincided with a substantial change in the Kuomintang's attitude towards Soong Ch'ing-ling. The Kuomintang had long been embarrassed by Soong Ch'ing-ling's criticism and in November 1935 had demoted her to alternate membership in the KMT Central Executive Committee. However, with the final contest with the Communists drawing near, Soong Ch'ing-ling was reinstated to full membership in 1945. She was also elected a KMT delegate to the National Assembly in 1946 and a year later she was appointed an adviser to the National government, whose policies she had always criticized.

Despite her new appointments, Soong Ch'ing-ling did not stop her criticism of the Kuomintang regime. What embarrassed the Kuomintang leaders most was Soong Ch'ing-ling's appeal for a coalition government, which policy the CCP was fostering at the time. In July 1946, Soong Ch'ing-ling wrote an article, entitled, "Statement Urging Coalition Government and An Appeal to the American People to Stop Their Government From Military Aiding the Kuomintang." She thoroughly analyzed her view of the KMT and CCP struggle. She regarded a civil war as disastrous to the Chinese people. If there was one, the Kuomintang should "bear the responsibility for provoking the civil war."<sup>49</sup> It was because of the Kuomintang's refusal to give up its one party-rule.



She stated:

"The coalition government must be set up immediately, it must not be brought into being solely by delegates appointed by the Kuomintang. Every party and political group must elect its own representatives. The Kuomintang delegates must also be elected by the membership and not appointed by a ruling group. There are many able, progressive members in the Kuomintang who have no chance to speak. Now is the time to build democracy by practising it."

Besides charging the Kuomintang ruling elite with being undemocratic, Soong Ch'ing-ling also accused Kuomintang of neglect of social and economic needs of the people. By this time, inflation was already uncontrollable. According to the study of Professor Wu-kang (吳岡), an economist in Shanghai, the total price index in Shanghai rose to 3723.75 using figures of January 1937, as one.<sup>50</sup> The economic collapse, as Soong Ch'ing-ling put it was due to the long-time neglect of the principle of the People's Livelihood. She further embarrassed the Kuomintang by saying that there was no famine in Communist areas because they had carried out Sun Yat-sen's "land to the tiller" policy.<sup>51</sup> Furthermore, she said, it was basically due to the Communist land policy that the peasants would support the Communists to defeat the Kuomintang reactionaries if there was to be a civil war.

The closing note of the article was an appeal to the American government not to give military aid to the reactionary Kuomintang. Soong Ch'ing-ling believed that "if America makes it plain that she will not supply munitions or military assistance, there will be no spreading of the Chinese civil war."<sup>52</sup>

To the disappointment of Soong Ch'ing-ling, the attempt to





form a coalition government failed and large scale fighting between the two parties became a reality. Soong Ch'ing-ling quickly joined in the war effort on the Communist side which she regarded as the true heirs of Sun Yat-sen's ideas. Late in 1946, she reorganized her Chinese Defense League into the China Welfare Fund. Besides organizing various relief organizations serving war refugees and orphans on both sides, the China Welfare Fund also used part of its cash reserve to finance many Communist oriented organizations.

Late in 1947, the tide of war turned in favour of the Communists. The morale of the Kuomintang forces was low and the ruling elite indulged in corruption. General Li Chi-shun of the Kuomintang broke away from the "decadent party" and organized the KMT Revolutionary Committee on January 1, 1948 with Soong Ch'ing-ling as the honorary chairman. To add to the political confusion of the time, Chiang Kai-shek resigned the presidency on March 29, 1948 but retained the posts as Director-General of the Kuomintang and the Generalissimo of the Kuomintang Army. Li Tsung-jen (李宗仁), the Acting President was therefore left the task of suing for peace. But Chiang Kai-shek who still had the army in his hand was, in effect, still the real master of Kuomintang.

Li Tsung-jen tried to enlist Soong Ch'ing-ling as a delegate to the peace talks.<sup>53</sup> But Soong Ch'ing-ling, who had never accepted any administrative post under Chiang Kai-shek, had no wish to break this tradition so long Chiang Kai-shek was still the master. The



peace negotiations finally failed, ostensibly because the Communists insisted upon punishing the war criminals, including Chiang Kai-shek and some KMT officials. Thereupon, the civil war continued until the final victory by the Chinese Communists. Chiang Kai-shek and his best troops retreated to Taiwan. With him went the hero of the Sian Incident, Chang Hsüeh-liang, who had been Chiang Kai-shek's personal prisoner since 1936.



## CHAPTER V

### SOONG CH'ING-LING AFTER 1949

#### A. Soong Ch'ing-ling and the Government

The Communist victory in 1949 and the retreat of Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan started another stage of development of the Chinese revolution. The period of incessant war which had plagued China for so long had ended. Instead, a relatively peaceful, centralized China came into being, and its government moved with breathtaking speed into a period of post-war reconstruction.

For Soong Ch'ing-ling, the Communist victory in 1949 was not only a victory of a revolutionary party over an obsolete, reactionary one, but it was also a victory of Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles (Nationalism, Democracy and the People's Livelihood) and his Three Policies (alliance with the Soviet Union; co-operation with the USSR; and the inclusion of the working masses and peasants in the revolutionary file). From her past association with the CCP, Soong Ch'ing-ling was certain that the Communists were worthy successors of Sun Yat-sen. To her, they would no doubt carry Sun's principles, especially that of the People's Livelihood, to its completion. Being one who was always enthusiastic about the people's welfare, Soong Ch'ing-ling immediately plunged herself into the frantic effort of reconstruction. Her fame as the "sainted" widow, her well-known passion for the happiness of the people and her wealth of experience in welfare and organizational



work made her an indispensable leader in these early years of reconstruction.

The Chinese communists had a long enduring admiration for Soong Ch'ing-ling. Her dedication to the livelihood of the Chinese people and her opposition to all sorts of injustice won the admiration of the communist leaders, many of whom had regarded her as an idol and as an inspiration during their youth. Many, such as Liao Ch'eng-chih, were actually saved from execution by the KMT through her intervention. In the most difficult days of the communists, in the early and middle thirties, Soong Ch'ing-ling had been the only one who openly spoke for them. And during the KMT blockade in the forties, Soong Ch'ing-ling used much of her funds to secure provisions, ammunition and medical personnel for the communist guerrillas. Though she has never joined the Chinese Communist Party, throughout the twenty-three years since the Communist victory, Soong Ch'ing-ling has stood and still stands high in the opinion of the communists, and she continues to chair many important organizations which, normally, would be chaired by communists.

Since April 1949, when the communist sponsored All-China Federation of Democratic Women elected her honorary chairman, Soong Ch'ing-ling has retained high position in the Chinese People's Republic. In July, she was asked to head the preparatory committee of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association -- a very unusual appointment for a non-communist. Probably her appointment had some underlying





reasons. One of the Three Policies which Dr. Sun had formulated in 1924, to supplement his Three Principles was to enlist the support of the Soviet Union for the Chinese revolution. By appointing Soong Ch'ing-ling to head the preparatory committee of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, the Communists showed to the people that they were the true successors of Dr. Sun's ideas. Soong Ch'ing-ling's acceptance of the appointment also gave credence to the idea. This was especially important in the Communist drive to win friends in the early fifties. Many of the neutral personalities, notably among the Kuomintang remnants, followed Soong Ch'ing-ling's lead.

The most substantial proof that the Chinese Communists genuinely respected Soong Ch'ing-ling was the reception they gave her in late August, 1949. Soong Ch'ing-ling was selected a "specially invited delegate" to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). When she arrived at Peking for the CPPCC, waiting on the platform was an array of Communist leaders, including Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Chou En-lai and practically the whole upper hierarchy of the Chinese Communist Party.<sup>1</sup> In the inaugural session of the Consultative Conference when the People's Republic was formally established, Soong Ch'ing-ling was elected a member of the steering committee of the CPPCC, and at the end of the Conference, she was elected one of the six vice-chairman of the Central People's government,<sup>2</sup> a position she still holds.

The speech that Soong Ch'ing-ling made at the inaugural session



of the CPPCC was one of the most important she had made. It was the first time she explicitly stated that the CCP was the "only" party that possessed the "strength of the masses" and was therefore provided the "surest" guarantee that Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles would be successfully carried out. This speech also showed Soong Ch'ing-ling to be imbued with a "communist messiahism" to save the people in the whole world, a vision she had never shown before. She said:

"... the struggle does not end until every hovel has been rebuilt into a decent house; until the products of the earth will be within easy purchase; until profits from the factories will be returned in equal amount to the work exerted; until every family can have complete medical care from the cradle to the grave. When these necessities are equally at hand for every one, regardless of race, color, creed and residence in this world, then can we say we have reached our goal."

Not only was this kind of grand vision of a world new to her, but it also represented an advance on Dr. Sun's People's Livelihood concept. It matched, to a certain extent, the Communist belief of world revolution. But as of 1949, no Chinese Communist had publicly expounded such a belief; they were too pre-occupied with the actual conditions and the immediate future of China.

Following her entry to the government, Soong Ch'ing-ling spent part of her time doing the routine work of government, and, as a member of the Political Consultative Conference, she helped in drafting various pieces of legislation. Early in 1953, when the government planned to hold the first nationwide election, and to adopt a constitution, Soong Ch'ing-ling was again elected to



membership of two vital committees; one to prepare for the election, and the other to draft the constitution. At the First National People's Congress (NPC), the new constitution, which Soong Ch'ing-ling had helped to draft, was adopted and she was again elected a vice-chairman of Liu Shao-chi's NPC Standing Committee. She relinquished this position in late 1959, obviously because of her ill-health.<sup>4</sup>

#### B. Soong Ch'ing-ling's Welfare Work

Besides busying herself in the routine work of the government, Soong Ch'ing-ling was also interested in the welfare and relief work; a field in which there was no one with comparable experience among the Communists. In fact, nearly all the post-war welfare organizations were created out of the existing institutions and organizations that Soong Ch'ing-ling had built during the twelve years of fighting. Because of the lack of adequate resources and experienced personnel in the early post-war years, there were tremendous problems in dealing with the monumental need for relief. Taking the initiative, Soong Ch'ing-ling called for a national conference of all welfare workers in April 1950. Various welfare organizations were asked to send representatives to the national conference. As a result, the People's Relief Administration of China (PRAC) was formed out of the amalgamation of these various organizations. Soong Ch'ing-ling was elected chairman of this new organization while some other important Communist leaders, including Tung Tei-shu (董必武), and Li Te-chuan



(李德全) served as vice-chairmen. The FRAC was the highest organ in welfare and relief work. Its work included the laying down of the nation's welfare plans and goals, the allocation of funds and personnel. Its aim, as Soong Ch'ing-ling had expounded in "A Message From New China," was to rely on the mass spirit of the Chinese people to attain to the stage of self help.<sup>5</sup> Obviously, the FRAC had a major job to do in 1950. The misery of flood, famine and unemployment were to receive the greater attention than ever before in Chinese history. Soong Ch'ing-ling later reported that in 1950 the FRAC transferred altogether nearly two million tons of grain from various provinces to the famine areas in South China, 25,000 kilometers of dykes were built, and 365 million meters of earth were shifted to control floods on the Yangtze, Hwei, Yellow, Yi, Pearl, Han and the Liao rivers.<sup>6</sup>

Soong Ch'ing-ling's own China Welfare Fund was reorganized into the China Welfare Institute (CWI) in August 1950. With the famine and relief work taken care of by the FRAC, the China Welfare Institute concentrated its effort in the emancipation of women, the problems of child-workers and the livelihood of farmers and soldiers. The CWI also engaged in developing techniques in the welfare field. Experimental and model projects in medicine and health, culture and education were the chief emphasis of the Institute. Results of the work of the CWI were reported in the China Reconstructs, a bi-monthly publication (became monthly in 1955) of which Soong Ch'ing-ling was the chief editor.





The greatest success of the CWH was in the elevation of the status of women and in the field of child care. A net-work of maternity, health, child-care institutions, nurseries were created as a model for similar institutions all over China. Also, working jointly with the Ministry of Education, the CWH established numerous children's cultural centers in the workers districts. A "little teacher" system was instituted in these centers to help wipe out illiteracy. Children were educated of the principle of "what you learn, you must teach others."<sup>7</sup> As soon as a group of children had become literate, they would in turn become teachers of other illiterate children. Not only was this "little teacher" system effective and economical, but the children, by taking up responsibility of helping other illiterates, were educated with the principle of mutual help, a doctrine the Communist government endeavoured to promote.

However, the importance of Soong Ch'ing-ling in the post-war welfare work was not limited to the leadership she provided. She developed a totally new concept and meaning of welfare. To Soong Ch'ing-ling, welfare and relief should not be only humanitarian in nature, which she regarded as not positive enough, nor should its scope be limited to giving out alms to the needy. On the contrary, the goal of welfare was to "eliminate the need of relief "<sup>8</sup> in the future. For if the goal of welfare was limited to giving aid to the needy, it would only create an ever continuing pattern of reliance by the recipients. Moreover, to Soong Ch'ing-ling, the misery of flood, famine and unemployment, could not be met by alms alone.



Therefore the basic way to administer welfare was to educate the people in the principle of "salvation through self-help, and self-help through production."<sup>9</sup> In fact, the most distinguished feature of Soong Ch'ing-ling's leadership in welfare work was to tie the administration of welfare to the entire economic reconstruction program of the new China. Unemployed and excess labor force in the farm areas were directed to build dams and dykes and other projects which were necessary to wipe out famine and natural disasters, such as flood and draught. Not only were the needy given meaningful employment and consequently food earned by their labour, but they were also given back their dignity by being able to contribute to the reconstruction of the nation and by being able to work for their bread.

### C. Soong Ch'ing-ling's foreign activities

Soong Ch'ing-ling's foreign activities were secondary among the many fields of her interest. The fact that she was not a Communist nor an official related to the Foreign Ministry limited her status to nothing more than a special good-will ambassador. Yet, Soong Ch'ing-ling's personal fame and her position as the vice-chairman of the Republic gave a kind of "glamour" to any foreign mission which she happened to lead. In important meetings, Soong Ch'ing-ling's position would be that of an honorary leader; the real political bickerings would probably fall on a party member who would serve as a deputy leader.



As the vice-chairman of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association (chairman after 1954), Soong Ch'ing-ling had written numerous articles to glorify the "selfless" help that the Soviet Union had given China.<sup>10</sup> When the Korean War broke out, Soong Ch'ing-ling, also joined in the criticism against the "planned concerted attack against the (Korean) popular movement" by the "Wall-street-rulers".<sup>11</sup>

It was only after 1951 that she began to carry a heavier responsibility in foreign activities. In 1951, April, Soong Ch'ing-ling was awarded the International Stalin Peace Prize, formally presented to her for her contribution to the Chinese people throughout the long years of revolutionary struggle. After receiving the Prize, she was frequently elected to high positions in many Communist international organizations. In 1952, she was elected a member of the Bureau of the World Peace Council (WPC) and also served as chairman of the Chinese delegation to the Peace Liaison Committee for Asian and Pacific Regions, a WPC regional off-shoot. In December 1952, Soong Ch'ing-ling was selected to lead the Chinese delegation to the Congress of the Peoples for Peace at Vienna, a meeting specially convened to discuss the Korean war. On the return journey via Moscow, Soong Ch'ing-ling was received by Stalin just a few weeks prior to his death. In a report given to the Standing Committee of the China Peace Committee on January 26, 1953, she stated that she was much impressed by the "steady rise of the material and cultural standards



of the Soviet people"<sup>12</sup> since her self-imposed exile in 1927.

Soong Ch'ing-ling's foreign visits in the mid-fifties were often good-will missions. This was in line with the "spirit of Bandung" which China was sponsoring. In December 1955, she led a Chinese delegation to India and Burma. Afterwards, in February, 1956, Soong Ch'ing-ling led another good-will mission to Pakistan which the west characterized as a mission "to woo wavering Pakistan out of the Western camp."<sup>13</sup> Consequently, she was branded as "a pudgy, hard-eyed huckster for Red China's Communist line."<sup>14</sup>

Soong Ch'ing-ling's health had been deteriorating since early 1949. In July 1956, her health took a bad turn, and she had to delay a visit to Indonesia on the invitation of President Sukarno for nearly a month. However, she mustered enough strength to accompany Mao Tse-tung to Moscow for the 40th anniversary of the Russian Revolution in November 1957. Her presence as the chairman of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association in the November Convention was highly symbolical in the atmosphere of deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations.

After 1957, Soong Ch'ing-ling's ill-health kept her inactive and, in fact in a semi-retirement. She turned down an invitation to attend the inauguration of the Republic of Ghana in 1960. Her health, apparently, did not improve until 1963 when she began to receive foreign guests, such as Norodom Sihanouk and his wife at her small home in Shanghai. In 1964, in February, Soong Ch'ing-ling went abroad again to Ceylon on the invitation of Premier Sirimavo Bandaranaike and was





joined by Chou En-lai and Ch'en I, the Foreign Minister.

Today she leads a retired life, spending most of her time in Shanghai. The tempestuous days of the Cultural Revolution seemed to have had no effect on her. Among the many leaders in post-liberation China, she is one among the very few whose name has never been smeared in the series of upheavals in the fifties and sixties. Today, as before, Soong Ch'ing-ling is still respected as the widow of Sun Yat-sen and as a revolutionary who had carried on a single-handed fight with the Kuomintang.

#### D. Conclusion

This study has presented a profile of Soong Ch'ing-ling's political activities since 1914. Her political career has spanned over sixty years. Soong Ch'ing-ling began with a naive concept of revolution, which matured and was tempered by a harsh, bitter and often humiliating revolutionary life, part of which she had happily shared with Sun Yat-sen. She finally progressed to become a revolutionary in her own right, fighting for the ideal she regarded as proper for China. That her political life is eventful is undoubtable. But what is more interesting is her reaction to those events. Protected by her fine and special status, Soong Ch'ing-ling could speak what other people would not dare to voice publicly; could write what other people would not even hint at; and could do what "lesser" people



would not dare to think of. Such is her uniqueness. Not even the powerful warlords, nor Mao Tse-tung could do the same. In a time when only military might counts, it is amazing that such a powerless and fragile woman could defy the forceful persuasion of family, the lure of comfort, and the dictates of the dictator. What powered such a defiance and sacrifice was Soong Ch'ing-ling's dedication to the Chinese revolution, to which her husband had dedicated forty years.

Unlike Sun Yat-sen, who had left behind him a powerful party-machine and an ideology for the revolutionaries to work with; unlike Mao Tse-tung who, with the help of other social forces, actually led the Chinese Communist Party to victory and set the pace of China's salvation, and unlike Chiang Kai-shek who had been the head of the Chinese government from 1927 to 1949 and had united a nation ravaged by warlords, Soong Ch'ing-ling has nothing as important attributed to her name. Without Sun, Mao and Chiang, China's history might have taken a different course. But without Soong Ch'ing-ling, China's history would certainly look the same. It is futile to overplay her importance in the Chinese revolution. But without her, the course of the Chinese revolution might be not so interesting, nor so dramatic. Surely, the irony that Chiang Kai-shek, who professed himself to be the successor to the venerated Sun, only to be denounced by Sun's widow as a traitor to what Sun had stood for, could never have happened; nor would the corruption, the terror and the repression exercised by the government in the twenties and thirties and forties have been



so well exposed.

But Soong Ch'ing-ling's contribution to the Chinese revolution, albeit minor, is far more than this. When the Chinese revolution had degenerated into a scramble for power and its main revolutionary party turned to reaction, Soong Ch'ing-ling was quick to call to the people's attention the reactionary nature of the new regime. By refusing to compromise with the new Kuomintang government formed in 1927, Soong Ch'ing-ling pointed out that the revolution had taken the wrong path. Her subsequent activities were symbolic of the yet unfinished revolution. In this respect, she was one of the first to lead the Chinese people out of the deceptive optimism of the late twenties. That the revolution meant much more than the unification of a score of warlords under a modern chief warlord was the theme of many of her articles and speeches in the twenties and thirties. Yet Soong Ch'ing-ling could be as pliant as a willow when facing the national crisis. During the War of Resistance, not only did she stop criticizing the Nationalist government, but she also advocated unity with the supreme command of Chiang Kai-shek. It was only when the Kuomintang became totally out of touch with the Chinese people that she threw her support unreservedly to the Communist Party. Soong Ch'ing-ling's career can be regarded as a case study; from naive, but dedicated idealism, through disillusionment, to embittered revulsion, and, finally, to rejection of the very party her husband had laboured to create and to which she herself had contributed.



Soong Ch'ing-ling's political life has been in contrast to her personality. Although shy, reserved, and retiring, when speaking of the Chinese revolution, she can be amazingly strong and forceful. Both Vincent Sheean and Edgar Snow found the contrast between Soong Ch'ing-ling's personality and her historical role impressive. She had almost become a legend with China's young radicals in the thirties and forties. Only after the Communist victory did she withdraw from political controversies and bury herself in working for the people's welfare. Today, in her eighty-third year, she still continues to personify the course of the Chinese revolution from Sun's overthrow of the Manchu dynasty to Mao's victory over Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang.





## FOOTNOTES

### Introduction

1. Vincent Sheean, Personal History (New York: Doubleday, 1935), 221
2. Vincent Sheean, "Some People from Canton," Asia and the Americas, XVII, Oct. 1927, 853.
3. Edgar Snow, Journey to the Beginning (New York: Random House, 1958), 35.
4. Ibid., 82.
5. Newsweek, February 6, 1956, 36.
6. H. Lieberman, "Madame Sun - China's Conscience," New York Times Magazine, August 11, 1946, 8.

### Chapter I

1. There are some conflicting reports on this point. In a written interview with Grace Thompson Seton, Ching-ling told the reporter that she was sent to the McTyeire School when she was twelve years old. But according to Emily Hahn's The Soong Sisters, Ching-ling went to the school at the age of seven. I think Miss Hahn is probably right, because both Soong Ch'ing-ling's elder and younger sisters went to the same school at five years old. See both Grace Thompson Seton, "The Great Leader of China," Review of Reviews, January 4, 1923, 630-4; and Emily Hahn, The Soong Sisters (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1970), 40.
2. The Meslerian, April 1912. See Emily Hahn, The Soong Sisters, 79-82. See also Leon Sharman, Sun Yat-sen (Harden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1965), 173.
3. Emily Hahn, The Soong Sisters, 82.
4. Ibid., 83.
5. Cornelia Spencer, Three Sisters (New York: John Day Co., 1939), 144.
6. Leon Sharman, Sun Yat Sen, 174.
7. Cornelia Spencer, Three Sisters, 145.
8. Leon Sharman, Sun Yat-sen, 183.



9. Cited in Cornelia Spencer, Three Sisters, 151-152.
10. Ibid., 159.
11. Bernard Martin, Strange Vicour, A Biography of Sun Yat-sen, (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1944), 168.
12. Wu Chu-fee, Sun Chung-sen Hsien Hsueh Chuan, (Taiwan: Commercial Press, 1964), 184.
13. Tang Tsangli, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution (Routledge, 1930), 19.
14. In an interview with Edgar Snow, Ch'ing-ling told him that she did not fall in love with Sun at first. She worshiped Sun as a hero and decided to join him to help save China. See Edgar Snow, Journey to the Beginning, (Random House, 1958), 88.
15. Cornelia Spencer, Three Sisters, 159. A similar account can also be found in Kuo-fu Sun Chung-sen Seng-Hsueh Chuan, (Taiwan: Committee in Commemorate Sun Yat-sen's 100th Birthday, 1965), 350.
16. Arnulf H. and Louise A. Esterer, Sun Yat-sen, China's Great Champion (New York: Julian Messner, 1970), 147.
17. Leon Sharman, Sun Yat-sen, 179-180.
18. Cornelia Spencer, Three Sisters, 191.
19. Kuo-fu Sun Chung-sen Seng-Hsueh Chuan, 352.
20. Ibid., 354. The exact date of Soong Ch'ing-ling's return to China from Tokyo is unclear. It should be around July, 1914. Therefore, she probably went back to Tokyo in October of the same year. The vagueness of these dates becomes part of the dispute surrounding the exact date of their subsequent marriage.
21. Edgar Snow, Journey to the Beginning, 88.
22. The date of marriage between Dr. Sun and Soong Ch'ing-ling is still a matter of dispute among all Dr. Sun's biographers. One group represented by Paul Linberger, Bernard Martin and Bishop Restarick maintained that the marriage date was October 25, 1915. The other group, mostly Taiwan scholars, regarded the marriage date should be on October 25, 1914. I personally think that the Taiwan scholars are right. Both Resarick and Martin wrote very closely to Linberger but Linberger's biography was not very accurate. For instance, he stated that Sun Yat-sen had divorced



22. his first wife before marrying Soong Ch'ing-ling, but actually Sun had only separated with his first wife. Secondly, Linberger claimed that Sun's first wife had gone back to take care of Sun's parents after the divorce. Actually, Sun's parents were dead at that time.
23. Edgar Snow, Journey to the Beginning, 88.
24. Cited in Emily Hahn, The Soong Sisters, 97-98.
25. Huo-fu Sun Chung-san Seng-Hseng Chuan, 354.
26. The Chung-hua He-min-tang (中華革命黨) was organized in Japan to replace the impotent Kuomintang immediately after the failure of the anti Yuan Shih-kai campaign in 1913. See T.C. Wong, Huan Yu Sun Chung-shan ti tsuan chi wo Mao Ching, (Taiwan: Wen Hsing Col, 1965), 21-22.
27. Leon Sharman, Sun Yat-sen, 182.
28. Edgar Snow, Journey to the Beginning, 39.
29. Henry Bond Restarick, Sun Yat-sen, Liberator of China, 136.
30. Chiang, before marrying Mei-ling, had a wife and several concubines. No legal divorce had been arranged to separate with them. The fact that the Suns were denounced and the Chiangs were acclaimed was because the latter had become the most "powerful" man in China while the former was in the lowest ebb of his political fortune when he married.
31. Shao Chuan-leng and Norman D. Palmer, Sun Yat-sen and Communism, (New York: Praeger, 1960), 22.
32. Wang, Chi-chen, "China's 'Sun' marches on," Herald Tribune, March 20, 1927.
33. Emily Hahn, The Soong Sisters, 103.
34. Vincent Sheean, Personal History (New York: Doubleday, 1934), 210.
35. Ibid.
36. One of the most dangerous escapes was during Chen Chuang-ming's revolt in Canton in 1922. Details see Huo-min He-min Shih, (Taiwan: Committee to Commemorate Sun Yat-sen's 100th birthday, 1965), 317-321.



37. Claude A. Buss, The Far East (New York: Macmillan, 1955), 150.
38. Shao Chuan Leng and Norman C. Palmer, Sun Yat-sen and Communism, 39.
39. For a detailed discussion of Dr. Sun's work in the reorganization of his party, see T'ang Leang-li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution, Chapter IX.
40. Leonard Shihlien Hsu stated that Dr. Sun had become an intimate friend of Lenin when they met in Europe in exile. But he presented no evidence to support his statement. See L.H. Hsu, Sun Yat-sen, His Political and Social Ideals (Los Angeles: University of South California Press, 1933), 34. Leon Sharman also stated that Dr. Sun had met a number of important Russian leaders during his exile in Europe, notably Chicherin. See Leon Sharman, Sun Yat-sen, 234.
41. Jane Degras (ed.), Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, 1917-1924 (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), Vol.1, 92.
42. Ho Hsiang-ning, Wei-ta ti Sun Chung-shan (Hong Kong: Hsin-ti Publishing Co., 1957), 39.
43. Sun Yat-sen, The International Development of China (New York: Putnam's and Son's, 1922), 236-7.
44. See Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen (Cambridge: Mass: Harvard University Press, 1954), Chapter 3.
45. L. Sherman, Sun Yat-sen, 246.
46. Henry Wei, China and Soviet Russia (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1956), 47.
47. Tu Hua, Chung-huo Hsin Min-chu chu-i Mo-ming shih, (Canton: Hsin-hua Bookstore, 1951), 44.
48. A complete copy of the manifesto can be found in Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and John F. Fairbank (ed.), A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952), 70-71.
49. Donald S. Klein and Anne B. Clark, Biographical Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1821-1965 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 733.





50. According to a biographical sketch of Ho Hsiang-ning who had just died in September 1972, Ho Hsiang-ning had even pledged to take care of Soong Ch'ing-ling at the death-bed of Dr. Sun in 1925. The relation between Ho Hsiang-ning and Ch'ing-ling in the 20's was a mixture of comradeship and personal friendship. Apparently, Soong Ch'ing-ling in the twenties was clearly oriented towards the left Kuomintang already. See Liao Heng-hsing (廖漢生), "My mother - Ho Hsiang-ning," Hong Kong, Ta Kung Pao, January 11, 1973.
51. In an interview with Edgar Snow, Soong Ch'ing-ling told Snow that before Chen Ch'ung-ming's revolt Sun believed that China should follow a different path from Russia. But after 1923, he recognized the necessity of a Communist revolution in China. See Edgar Snow, Journey to the Beginning, 92.
52. The New York Times, May 24, 1925. The authenticity of this message cannot be doubted. At the writing of this letter (drafted by Eugene Chen), both the right and left Kuomintang members were present. Dr. Sun himself signed the letter.

## Chapter II

1. Leon Sharman, "Sun Yat-sen Cult," Asia and the Americas, July, 1934, 393-397.
2. D. Klein and A. Clark, Biographical Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-1965, 733.
3. Chinese workers of Japanese cotton-mills in Shanghai and Tsingtao went on a general strike in late May. An organizer of this strike was brutally killed by Japanese police. Students held a demonstration in the International settlement in Shanghai to protest this homicide. A number of students were arrested and they were scheduled for trial on May 30, 1925. Another big demonstration was held at the date of trial. The British policemen fired on the demonstrations, resulting hundreds wounded and thirteen killed. The June 23rd Incident was a direct sequel of the May 30 Incident. The news of May 30 Incidents provoked anti-British feeling among thousands of students and workers. They assembled under the leadership of the Canton Government and held a demonstration in Shameen, the British Settlement in Canton. The British and French machine gunners fired at the crowd resulting 52 killed and 117 wounded. See Agnes Smedley, The Great Road, (New York: Random House), 161. See also John Israel, Student Nationalism in China, 1927-1937 (California: Stanford University Press, 1966), 4-5.



4. The strikes in Hong Kong were primarily aimed at giving a blow to Britain's prestige in China. The Canton Government, notably Borodin, hoped that a blow at Britain would weaken the whole system of foreign privilege in China. See Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs (London: 1930), II, 634.
5. Emily Hahn, The Soong Sisters, 126.
6. Vincent Sheean, "Some People from Canton," Asia and the Americas, October, 1927, 112-7
7. Cornelia Spencer, The Three Sisters, 209.
8. H. Lieberman, "T'ao. Sun, China's Conscience," New York Times Magazine, August 11, 1946, 8.
9. Agnes Smedely, The Great Road, 159.
10. Cited in Shanti Swarup, A Study of Chinese Communist Movement, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 31.
11. Nyar Wales, Red Dust (California: Stanford, 1952), 30-31. In his autobiographical account to Nyn Wales, Liao Cheng-chih (廖承志), son of Liao Chung-kai, refers to his father's powerful position in the Kuomintang before his assassination.
12. Chung-Gi Kwei, The Kuomintang-Communist Struggle in China, 23.
13. Nowadays Kuomintang sources tried to blame the assassination of Liao Chung-kai as a British plot to avenge the Hong Kong general strike in 1925. But there was no evidence to support this accusation. On the other hand, Hu Han-min's implication in the assassination was undeniable because six of the arrested military commanders was Hu's close followers and Hu's brother, Hu Yi-sheng (胡毅生) was one of the chief plotters of the assassination. See Tung Hsien-Kuang, Chiang Chung-tung Chuen (Taiwan, Chung Hwa Min-Kua Chu-Pan Wei-Yuan Hui, (952), 62.
14. Chung-Gi Kwei, The Kuomintang-Communist Struggle in China 1922-1949, 30.
15. Hu-min and Hsiang-fung, Chung Ku-Shi Tao Chung-hua Jen-Min Kung Ho Kuo Ti Tan Sheng (Peking: Hsing Chao, 1951), 54.
16. Shanti Swarup, A Study of the Chinese Communist Movement, 32. Subsequent strong reactions against the Right precipitated another schism in the Kuomintang Rightists led by Tai Chi-tao



16. (戴季陶), Tsou Lu (邹鲁) and Shan Ting-yi (沈定一) fled from Canton and organized the Western Hills Conference in Peking to denounce the infiltration of the Communists. This Western Hills Clique were characterized by Chen Tu-hsiu (陈独秀) as a group who "falsely advocate anti-imperialism and warlordism, and falsely believed in the Three Principles, yet actually do not wish to practise them" (cited in Kuo-min Ke Min Shih, op. cit., 401. My translation). The Canton Government reacted by ousting the ring leaders of the Western Hills Clique at the Second Kuomintang Congress in January 1926, which resulted a dominating control of the Kuomintang by the Leftists and the Chinese Communists. Li Tai-chao (李大钊), Tan Ping-shan (谭平山), Mao Tse-tung, Tang Ying-chao (唐英朝) and four other Communists were elected to high positions in the Kuomintang. For a detailed account of the Western Hills Clique, see Tsou Lu, Hui ku Lu, Vol. 1, 181-182.
17. March 18, 1926, Chiang Kai-shek imposed martial law giving the reason that the acting chief of the Navy, Li Chih-lung (李之龙); a Communist, disobeyed his personal order. He further reasoned that the Communists had plotted to overthrow him. Two days later, the gunboat, Chung Shan was on fire. With this, he accused the Chinese Communists of planning a riot. Immediately, he arrested Li Chih-lung and about fifty other Communists, including Chou En-lai. Guards at the Residences of the Russian advisers and at the headquarters of the Strike Committee were disarmed. All these measures were taken by the authority of Chiang alone. See C. Martin Wilbur and L.I. How, Documents on Communism, Nationalism and Soviet Advisers in China, 1913-1927 (New York: Columbia, 1956), 218.
18. Chiang's clear-cut victory needs some explanation. First, Chiang, being the President of the Whampoa Military Academy, and Commander of the First Army of the Kuomintang, was militarily the most powerful person after Lu Han-min was exiled. But this cannot sufficiently explain the relatively "soft" attitude of the Soviet Union. However, a glimpse of the reason of the Soviet Union's reaction can be obtained by a careful reading of Document 23, which is a report written by Stepanov, a Russian adviser in the Kuomintang. (See Martin Wilbur and L.I. How, Documents on Communism, Nationalism and Soviet Advisers in China, 1913-1927, 219) Stepanov concluded that Chiang was an extremely egoistic and ambitious man, and that Chiang's personality was entirely dominated by a lust for glory and power. The only way to obtain Chiang's co-operation was "by satisfying his desire for glory and enabling him to achieve greater power and strength than he now enjoys." Apparently, the Russian's "soft" reaction was based





18. on Stephanov's analysis of Chiang Kai-shek.

Therefore, when Chiang also demanded the abolition of the leftist inspired Sun Yat-senist Society and the League of military youth, the removal of the Party representative system, a dual command system, in his army and the disability of the Communists to head any KMT Committees, the Communists complied with these restrictions without much unwillingness.

Though Stephanov's analysis of Chiang was correct as later events have proved, the "soft" strategy adopted by the Russians was a complete failure in 1927.

19. Wilbur and Hoy, Documents on Communism, Nationalism and Soviet Advisers in China, 1918-1927, 370.
20. Shanghai was taken from within by organized workers led by Chou En-lai who had gone into the city in disguise. March 21, 1927, three hundred armed workers and nearly 800,000 unarmed workers started attacking police stations simultaneously. After a thirty hour battle, Shanghai was captured. Then they sent a delegate to welcome Chiang Kai-shek. Two days later, Chiang forces occupied Hankow. See Wu Min and Tsiao-fung, Chung Ku-shih Tao Chung-Hua Jeh-min, 70.
21. J.B. Powell, Ly Twentz-Five Years in China (New York: MacMillan Co., 1954), 153.
22. Vincent Sheean, Personal History, 243.
23. Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Random House, 1953), 243.
24. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Tao Chuan-tang Tung-chih Shu (Letter to Comrades of the Whole Party), 7.
25. The Times (London), June 24, 1927.
26. Maxwell Stewart, "Time. Sun Yat-sen Speaks", Christian Century, January 1, 1930, 15-16.
27. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "Statement issued in protest against the violation of Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary principles and policies." Hankow, July 14, 1927. Collected in Soong Ch'ing-ling's The Struggle for New China (London: Foreign Language Press, 1952), 1.
28. Ibid., 2-3.
29. "Report on an Investigation into the Peasants Movements in Hunan," Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, 1, 4 vols. (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1954), 32.





29. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, 1, 4 Vols. (London: Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., 1954), 32.
30. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "Statement Issued in Protests Against the Violation of Sun Yat-sen's Revolutionary Principles and Policies," 6.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., 2.

### Chapter III

1. Cornelia Spencer, The Three Sisters, 217.
2. Edgar Snow, Journey to the Beginning, 82.
3. Vincent Sheean, Personal History, 265.
4. Maxwell S. Stewart, "The Sun Yat-sen Speaks", Christian Century, January 1, 1930, 13.
5. For a detail account of the Nanchang Uprising, see C. Martin, "The Ashes of Defeat," China Quarterly (April-June, 1964), 13: 3-54. Only two members of the Presidium were Communists, Yuan Tai-ying and Tan P'ing-shan. The others were Left Kuomintang members. The Committee included those dignitaries as Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ho-lung, Li-Li-san and Luo Ho-jo.
6. Randall Gould, "The Sun Keeps Faith," The Nation, January 22, 1930, 109-110.
7. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "Statement Before Leaving For Moscow," Struggle For New China, 7.
8. Ibid., 10.
9. Ibid., 10-11.
10. Not only in political, social and economic programs that the Communists were indeed the true inheritors of Dr. Sun's ideals. The Communists also used all sorts of propaganda to capitalize upon this. A typical example was a song sung by the Communists in Chingkanshan. The song vowed to follow Dr. Sun's Three Principles of nationalism, democracy, and People's Livelihood. See



10. Agnes Smedly, The Great Road, 231.
11. Vincent Sheean, Personal History, 266.
12. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "Women and Revolution," Struggle For New China, 22.
13. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "Youth and Revolution," Struggle For New China, 24.
14. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "Statement Issued in Moscow," Struggle for New China, 14-16.
15. Vincent Sheean, Personal History, 289.
16. The wedding was held in the ballroom of the Majestic Hotel, the most extravagant hotel in Shanghai. Over 1300 guests were invited, including nearly all representatives of foreign imperial powers whose vested interest in China were once the revolution had vowed to destroy. Foreign dignitaries such as Edwin S. Cunningham (Senior American consul), Sir Sidney Barton (Consul-General of Britain), Mr. S. Yada (Japanese Consul General), and Mr. Maggiar (French Consul-General) were present for the ceremony. For a detailed description of the wedding, see Shanghai Times, Dec. 2, 1927.
17. Whether the marriage was a political maneuver of Chiang Kai-shek is hard to prove. But any consideration must take into account two facts: 1) Chiang Kai-shek had once proposed to Soong Ch'ing-ling through a middleman after Dr. Sun's death and Soong Ch'ing-ling had contemptuously regarded it as a political move; 2) As a condition Chiang Kai-shek who had known little about Christianity promised to become a Christian. These informations were obtained by Edgar Snow in an interview with Soong Ch'ing-ling. See Edgar Snow, Journey to the Beginning, 85.
18. Vincent Sheean, Personal History, 301.
19. Ibid.
20. Anna Louise Strong, "Mrs. Sun Yat-sen Flees From Victory," Survey, October 1923, 34.
21. Ibid.
22. Cited in Randall Gould, "Time. Sun Yat-sen Keeps Faith," Nation, January 2, 1930, 109.



23. Betty Turner, "China's Soong Sisters," Independent Woman, February 1937, 55.
24. Maxwell Stewart, "The Sun Yat-sen Speaks," Christian Century, 16.
25. The close relation between the Soong family and the Nanking government could only be understood by the power of the Soong family. Betty Turner of the Independent Woman reported that, "No man, without her (the old Mrs. Soong) assent, could hold an important government position." See Betty Turner, "China's Soong Sisters," Independent Woman, 55.
26. Cited in Randall Gould, "The Sun Yat-sen Keeps Faith," 110.
27. Cited in Emily Hahn's The Soong Sisters, 159.
28. Maxwell S. Stewart, "The Sun Yat-sen Speaks," 17.
29. Ibid., 17
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. John Israel, Student Nationalism in China, 1927-1937 (California: Stanford University Press, 1966), 33.
34. Soong Ch'ing-ling "The Kuomintang is no Longer a Political Power," Struggle for New China, 27-31.
35. Ibid., 31.
36. These two secret police organizations were staffed by gangsters and members of secret societies. The latter specialized in political assassinations. See Lu Hua, Chung Kuo Hsin-min Chu Chu-i He-rin Shih (Peking: Hsin Hua Bookstore, 1950), 128-129.
37. Cited in Ibid., 105. My translation.
38. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "The Tasks of the China League for Civil Rights," Struggle for New China, 48.
39. Ibid., 33.
40. Ibid., 33-34.



41. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "Address to the Press at a Meeting of the China League for Civil Rights," Struggle for New China, 50.
42. Ibid.
43. To this accusation, Lo Teng-hsien, one of the accused, replied: "I shall tell you my record. I helped organize the Hong Kong strike in 1925. I have just returned Northeast where I fought with volunteers (against the Japanese). I have helped organize strikes in the Japanese cotton mills in Shanghai. That was all part of the struggle against imperialism. Is this what is meant when I am charged with engaging in "counter-revolutionary" activities?" Cited in Soong Ch'ing-ling's press release to the Chinese people, " Struggle For New China, 54.
44. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "A Denunciation of the Persecution of German Progressives and the Jewish People," Struggle for New China, 60.
45. Edgar Snow, Journey to the Beginning, 87-88.
46. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "Statement upon the Assassination of Yang-Chuan," Struggle for New China, 84.

#### Chapter IV

1. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "Workers of China, Unite!" The Struggle for New China, 62.
2. The League sent Lord Lytton to investigate the Manchurian Incident. A report was produced by Lytton's commission in September 1932, casting adverse reflections on Japan's conduct in Manchuria. But the report also evaded the legal issue whether Japan had committed aggression. See League of Nations Commission of Inquiry, Manchuria, (Washington, 1932).
3. Chiang's policy of concession had grave consequence even in his own party bureaucracy. Hu Han-min even wrote an article in the China Weekly Review alleging Chiang of his selling of the Country. China Weekly Review, June 10, 1933.
4. Hu-min and Hsiao-fung, Chung Ku-Shi Tao Chung-Hua Jen-Min, 152.
5. Agnes Smedley, The Great Road, 291.
6. "On the New Democracy," Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, 260.
7. Hsiao Iso-liang, Lower Relations Within the Chinese Communist





7. Movement: A Study of Documents, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961), 224-225.
8. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "Workers of China, Unite!", Struggle For New China, 61-66.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "Statement Issued As China Representative of the World Committee Against Imperialist War," Struggle for New China, 71
13. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "China's Freedom and the Fight Against War," (main address delivered before the Shanghai Anti-war Congress), Struggle for New China, 72.
14. Ibid., 72
15. Ibid., 73
16. Ibid., 79
17. China Weekly Review, August 11, 1934, 407.
18. Ibid., August 13, 1934, 443.
19. Hu Hua, Chung-kuo Hsin Min-chu Chu-i Te-ming Shih Tzu-liao, (Peking: Jen-min Chu Pan She, 1951), 261.
20. Mao Tse-tung, "Lun Fan-tui Jih-pen Ti-kuo Chu-i Te T'se-lueh," Mao Tse-tung Hsuan-chi (Peking: Jen Min Chu Pan She, 1961), 143.
21. Chung-kuo Hsin Min-chu Chu-i Te-ming Shih, 261.
22. Cited in China Weekly Review, August 13, 1934, 443.
23. Ibid., 443-449.
24. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "Statement Issued Upon the Arrest of the Seven Gentlemen," Struggle for New China, 85.
25. Ibid., 86.
26. Chung-Gi Hwei, The Kuomintang-Communist Struggle in China, 1922-1949, 13.



27. Kao Yin-tsu, ed., Chung-hua Min-kuo Ta Shih-chi (Taipei: Shih-chih She, 1957), 429.
28. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, I, 231-232. See also China Weekly Review, February 27, 1937, 433.
29. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "Follow the Will of Sun Yat-sen in a Speech Delivered to the Third Plannary Session of the Kuomintang," Struggle For New China, 87.
30. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "Confucianism and Modern China," Struggle For New China, 92-194.
31. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "China Unconquerable," Struggle for New China, 107.
32. Ibid.
33. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "Letters to the British Labour Party Delegates Conducting a Survey of Japanese Aggression in China," Struggle For New China, 118.
34. In 1940, eight tons of medicines which Soong Ch'ing-ling had obtained from various foreign organizations were earmarked for the needy Communists. At Sanyuan, Shansi, the KMT blockading army confiscated the medicine which were last seen for sale in the black-market. No attempt was made to arrest the blockading military commander.
35. Israel Epstein, The Unfinished Revolution in China (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1947), 134.
36. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "An Appeal For Aid To Partisan Fighters," Struggle for New China, 132.
37. Israel Epstein, The Unfinished Revolution, 134.
38. Ibid., 135.
39. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "When China Wins," Struggle for New China, 138.
40. Ibid., 138-139
41. Ibid., 138.
42. Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends. The United Front in Chinese Communist History, 96-97.
43. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "China Needs More Democracy," Struggle For



43. New China, 143-149.
44. Ibid., 146.
45. Ibid., 147.
46. Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Reports, 1944, China, (Washington, D.C., 1967), V.I., 385-386.
47. Minutes of talks between Chiang Kai-shek and Henry J. Wallace taken by John Carter Vincent, head of the China Affairs Division, U.S. Department of State.
48. United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949, edited by the Department of State, USA, 74.
49. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "Statement Urging Coalition Government and An Appeal to the American People to Stop Their Government From Military Aiding the Kuomintang," Struggle for New China, 193.
50. Wu-kang (吳岡), Chiu Chung-kuo Tung-fa an-chiang Chih-liao (Shanghai: Jen-min Chu-pan-she, 1958), 161.
51. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "Statement Urging Coalition Government and An Appeal to the American People to Stop this Government from Military Aiding the Kuomintang," Struggle for New China, 182.
52. Ibid., 183.
53. China Digest, Hong Kong February 8, 1949, 23.

#### Chapter V

1. Time, September 19, 1949, 39.
2. Three of the six vice-chairman were drawn from inner circle the CCP. They were Liu Shao-chi, Chu-teh and Mao Kang. Two others were from Non-Communist parties (the KMT Revolutionary Committee and the Democratic League) and Soong Ch'ing-ling, because of her fame as the "sainted widow" and the respect that the CCP shown to her, was elected as a representative of a China's democratic personages.
3. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "Speech at the CPPCC," Struggle for New China, 194.



4. Edgar Snow, a friend of Soong Ch'ing-ling since the early thirties, reported in 1961 that Soong Ch'ing-ling's health was in an "acute stage." See Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River (London, 1963), 544.
5. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "A Message From New China," Struggle for New China, 273-288.
6. Ibid.
7. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "China's Children in the Liberation Struggle," Struggle for New China, 240.
8. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "A Message from New China," 274.
9. Ibid.
10. Notable ones are "On Sino-Soviet Friendship"; "Speech made at the Inaugural Conference of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association"; "Friendship is Unity." All are selected in the Struggle for New China.
11. Soong Ch'ing-ling, "What the Korean People's Struggle Means to Asia," Struggle for New China, 263.
12. "Soong Ch'ing-ling's Speech at a Meeting of the China Peace Committee," People's China, February 15, 1953, 12.
13. Time, February 6, 1956, 36.
14. Ibid.





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